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Fix lint issues.
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source/mainnet/smart-contracts/guides/factory-pattern.rst

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@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ redeploying the code. This eliminates one of the key motivations for using a fac
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interface would be implemented by `MySqlDatabaseConnectionFactory` and
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`SQLiteDatabaseConnectionFactory` (and potentially others). Which specific database connection
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is constructed depends on which factory is provided.
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In the factory method pattern, the code resides in an base class that has an abstract method
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for constructing `DatabaseConnection` objects. The base class is then subclassed to provide
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different implementation of the factory method.
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ redeploying the code. This eliminates one of the key motivations for using a fac
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On Concordium, the same problem does not really exist (viewing contract instances as the
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analogue of objects). Contract instances are always created by top-level transactions, and
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the contract being instantiated is always explicitly determined.
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Another motiviation for using a factory pattern might be for the factory to have some on-going
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relationship with the products that it produces. In particular, the factory could maintain an
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ identify the code of the smart contract instance.
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Getting the module reference and contract name is done using the host functions
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``contract_module_reference`` and ``contract_name``, respectively. Note: both of these functions
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are introduced in protocol version 7, and will not work while the chain is running an earlier
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are introduced in protocol version 7, and will not work while the chain is running an earlier
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protocol version.
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In this example, the factory and product contracts are defined in the same module.
@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ the invoker Adversary does not match the owner User), but success for User:
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.. image:: images/factory-tricked.svg
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:alt: sequence diagram showing how a hijacking attempt may succeed if the user is deceived into signing a bad transaction
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This is hopefully unlikely. Moreover, the effect of
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such a hijacking should typically be that the product cannot be used as the
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user intended, but the user would still be able to create another product
@@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ At this point, it just remains to initialize the state of the product:
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factory,
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};
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*state = ProductState::Initialized(product);
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.. Note::
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@@ -389,4 +389,4 @@ product contract must:
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It is important to always consider the risks presented by malicious third
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parties and to evaluate if any given solution is appropriate to the
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application at hand.
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application at hand.

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