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Copy file name to clipboardExpand all lines: lectures/match_transport.md
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@@ -28,26 +28,23 @@ and Zhenyuan Zhang {cite}`boerma2023composite` used optimal transport theory to
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Production technologies allow firms to affect shape costs of mismatch with the consequence
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that costs of mismatch can be concave.
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That means that it possible that equilibrium there is neither **positive assortive** nor **negative assorting** matching, an outcome that {cite}`boerma2023composite` call **composite assortive** matching.
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That means that it is possible that equilibrium there is neither **positive assortive** nor **negative assorting** matching, an outcome that {cite}`boerma2023composite` call **composite assortive** matching.
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For example, in an equilibrium with composite matching, identical **workers** can sort into different **occupations**, some positively and some negatively.
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For example, in an equilibrium with composite matching, identical *workers* can sort into different *occupations*, some positively and some negatively.
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{cite}`boerma2023composite`
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show how this can generate distinct distributions of labor earnings within and across occupations.
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{cite}`boerma2023composite` show how this can generate distinct distributions of labor earnings within and across occupations.
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This lecture describes the {cite}`boerma2023composite` model and presents Python code for computing equilibria.
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The lecture applies the code to the {cite}`boerma2023composite` model of labor markets.
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As with an earlier QuantEcon lecture on optimal transport (https://python.quantecon.org/opt_transport.html), a key tool will be **linear programming**.
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As with an [earlier QuantEcon lecture on optimal transport](https://python.quantecon.org/opt_transport.html), a key tool will be [linear programming](https://intro.quantecon.org/lp_intro.html).
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## Setup
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$X$ and $Y$ are finite sets that represent two distinct types of people to be matched.
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For each $x \in X,$ let a positive integer $n_x$ be the number of agents of type $x$.
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so that the matching problem is *balanced*.
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Given a *cost function* $c:X \times Y \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, the (discrete) *optimal transport problem* is
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Given a **cost function** $c \colon X \times Y \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, the (discrete) **optimal transport problem** is
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$$
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\begin{aligned}
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\min_{\mu \geq 0}& \sum_{(x,y) \in X \times Y} \mu_{xy}c_{xy} \\
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\text{s.t. }& \sum_{x \in X} \mu_{xy} = n_x \\
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& \sum_{y \in Y} \mu_{xy} = m_y
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\end{aligned}
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\begin{aligned}
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\min_{\mu \geq 0}& \sum_{(x,y) \in X \times Y} \mu_{xy}c_{xy} \\
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\text{s.t. }& \sum_{x \in X} \mu_{xy} = n_x \\
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& \sum_{y \in Y} \mu_{xy} = m_y
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\end{aligned}
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$$
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Given our discreteness assumptions about $n$ and $m$, the problem admits an integer solution $\mu \in \mathbb{Z}_+^{X \times Y}$, i.e. $\mu_{xy}$ is a non-negative integer for each $x\in X, y\in Y$.
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Given our discreteness assumptions about $X$ and $Y$, the problem admits an integer solution $\mu \in \mathbb{Z}_+^{X \times Y}$, i.e., $\mu_{xy}$ is a non-negative integer for each $x\in X, y\in Y$.
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We will study integer solutions.
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Two points about restricting ourselves to integer solutions are worth mentioning:
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* it is without loss of generality for computational purposes, since every problem with float marginals can be transformed into an equivalent problem with integer marginals;
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* although the mathematical structure that we present actually wors for arbitrary real marginals, some of our Python implementations would fail to work with float arithmetic.
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* although the mathematical structure that we present actually works for arbitrary real marginals, some of our Python implementations would fail to work with float arithmetic.
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We focus on a specific instance of an optimal transport problem:
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We assume that $X$ and $Y$ are finite subsets of $\mathbb{R}$ and that the cost function satisfies $c_{xy} = h(|x - y|)$ for all $x,y \in \mathbb{R},$ for an $h: \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ that is **strictly concave** and **strictly increasing** and **grounded** (i.e., $h(0)=0$).
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We assume that $X$ and $Y$ are finite subsets of $\mathbb{R}$ and that the cost function satisfies $c_{xy} = h(|x - y|)$ for all $x,y \in \mathbb{R},$ for an $h: \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ that is *strictly concave* and *strictly increasing* and *grounded* (i.e., $h(0)=0$).
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Such an $h$ satisfies the following
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**Lemma.**Let $h: \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ be **strictly concave** and **grounded**. Then $h$ is strictly subadditive, i.e. for all $x,y\in \mathbb{R}_+, 0< x < y,$ we have
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**Lemma.**If $h \colon \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ is strictly concave and grounded, then $h$ is strictly subadditive, i.e. for all $x,y\in \mathbb{R}_+, 0< x < y,$ we have
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$$
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h(x+y) < h(x) + h(y)
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h(x+y) < h(x) + h(y)
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$$
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*Proof.* For $\alpha \in (0,1)$ and $x >0$ we have, by strict concavity and groundedness, $h(\alpha x) > \alpha h(x) + (1-\alpha) h(0)=\alpha h(x). $
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*Proof.* For $\alpha \in (0,1)$ and $x >0$ we have, by strict concavity and groundedness, $h(\alpha x) > \alpha h(x) + (1-\alpha) h(0)=\alpha h(x)$.
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Now fix $x,y\in \mathbb{R}_+, 0< x < y,$ and let $\alpha = \frac{x}{x+y};$ the previous observation gives $h(x) = h(\alpha (x+y)) > \alpha h(x+y)$ and $h(y) = h((1-\alpha) (x+y)) > (1-\alpha) h(x+y) $; summing these inequality delivers the result. $\square$
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@@ -512,7 +509,7 @@ We conclude that if a matching features intersecting pairs, it can be modified v
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When we introduce the off diagonal matching, to stress that the types sets are disjoint now.
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To simplify our explanation of this property, assume for now that each agent has its own distinct type (i.e., |X|=|Y| =N and $n=m= \mathbf{1}_N$), in which case the optimal transport problem is also referred to as *assignment problem*.
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To simplify our explanation of this property, assume for now that each agent has its own distinct type (i.e., $|X| = |Y| =N$ and $n=m= \mathbf{1}_N$), in which case the optimal transport problem is also referred to as *assignment problem*.
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