|
| 1 | +--- |
| 2 | +title: Domain Manager adoption notes |
| 3 | +type: Standard |
| 4 | +track: IAM |
| 5 | +status: Draft |
| 6 | +replaces: scs-0302-v1-domain-manager-role.md |
| 7 | +--- |
| 8 | + |
| 9 | +## Introduction |
| 10 | + |
| 11 | +After the domain manager persona has been implemented certain issues in the |
| 12 | +standard adoption and verification started being raised by CSPs: |
| 13 | + |
| 14 | +- Not every CSP is using domains to separate customers. |
| 15 | + |
| 16 | +- CSP may rely on the Identity federation in which case it is impossible or is |
| 17 | +prohibited to manage identities on OpenStack side (OpenStack is a service |
| 18 | +provider and not an identity provider). |
| 19 | + |
| 20 | +- CSP may customize authorization policies in a different way so that domain |
| 21 | +manager can not be implemented by simply reusing the upstream implementation. |
| 22 | + |
| 23 | +As such simple enforcement of the Domain Manager persona can not be achieved. |
| 24 | + |
| 25 | +This standard clarifies base standard and splits requirements into recommended |
| 26 | +and mandatory to provide better granularity while still giving guidance with |
| 27 | +the goal to provide a smooth user experience for the end users. |
| 28 | + |
| 29 | +Requiring customer to use CSP specific APIs to manage identity data is |
| 30 | +contradicting with the idea of certification as such. It hinders customers from |
| 31 | +having a smooth user experience across different cloud providers forcing them |
| 32 | +to adapt their management strategies on such clouds. Moreover it represent a |
| 33 | +lock-in what is contradicting with the idea of SovereignCloudStack. |
| 34 | + |
| 35 | +### Mandatory capabilities |
| 36 | + |
| 37 | +#### Assign roles to users/group on projects/domain |
| 38 | + |
| 39 | +One of the main initial concerns of the Domain Manager was the ability of the |
| 40 | +customer to manage user permissions in a self-service manner. OpenStack |
| 41 | +Keystone provides an easy possibility to smoothly integrate role assignments |
| 42 | +with arbitrary external systems in a transparent way (a role assignment backend |
| 43 | +plugin can be provided to persist assignments in any external system). As such |
| 44 | +this capability MUST be supported by the CSP using OpenStack APIs or role |
| 45 | +assignments. |
| 46 | + |
| 47 | +#### Project creation |
| 48 | + |
| 49 | +Another important requirement was to provide self-service capability for |
| 50 | +customers to create projects as desired without requesting CSP support. This |
| 51 | +capability MUST be available using native cloud APIs. |
| 52 | + |
| 53 | +#### Project editing |
| 54 | + |
| 55 | +Customer must be able to activate or deactivate project access without |
| 56 | +requesting CSP support. This capability provides possibility to temporarily |
| 57 | +disable users to authorize into certain project by modifying`enabled` property |
| 58 | +of the project. Further control of the project name, description, options and |
| 59 | +tags MUST be provided to the customer using native Keystone API. |
| 60 | + |
| 61 | +:::info |
| 62 | + |
| 63 | +Project deletion using Keystone API is not mandatory since CSP may have certain |
| 64 | +expectations on the resources cleanup. This requirement is described in detail |
| 65 | +in a dedicated chapter. |
| 66 | + |
| 67 | +::: |
| 68 | + |
| 69 | +### Recommended capabilities |
| 70 | + |
| 71 | +Relying on the Identity federation conceptually changes ways of identity |
| 72 | +resource management. This makes it impossible to fulfill them as MUST |
| 73 | +requirements. This chapter describes remaining capabilities of the initial |
| 74 | +Domain Manager as SHOULD implement. |
| 75 | + |
| 76 | +#### Domains usage |
| 77 | + |
| 78 | +It is strongly suggested to rely on the Domain concept of Keystone to implement |
| 79 | +multi-tenancy. |
| 80 | + |
| 81 | +Usage of domains by itself allows to implement form of self-service management |
| 82 | +by the customer. Only identity resources are owned by domains (with projects |
| 83 | +being also identity resources). Other services use projects to for resources |
| 84 | +isolation. They do not need to be domain aware. |
| 85 | + |
| 86 | +Using domains allows implementing [domain |
| 87 | +limits](https://docs.openstack.org/keystone/latest/admin/unified-limits.html#domain-limits) |
| 88 | +which allow to set a global resources limit for the customer. Without domains |
| 89 | +specific limits artificial control of the overall customer consumption must be |
| 90 | +implemented. |
| 91 | + |
| 92 | +#### User management |
| 93 | + |
| 94 | +User management (creation, activation, deactivation, deletion) SHOULD be |
| 95 | +possible using OpenStack APIs. |
| 96 | + |
| 97 | +When an external IdP is being used (IdP federation) there is still an |
| 98 | +expectation that local users may be required by customers. As such creation of |
| 99 | +users (pre-creating federated users or regular local users) within customer |
| 100 | +domain SHOULD me possible. Keystone does not allow certain operations on |
| 101 | +federated users (i.e. password change, MFA, name) as such allowing customers to |
| 102 | +manage users using OpenStack APIs should not conflict with any additional |
| 103 | +requirements. |
| 104 | + |
| 105 | +Security requirements on the customer side or on the CSP side to only allow |
| 106 | +federated users to consume platform services was used as the limitating factor |
| 107 | +forcing degrading of the capability requirement. |
| 108 | + |
| 109 | +#### Group management |
| 110 | + |
| 111 | +Management of groups SHOULD be possible using OpenStack APIs. |
| 112 | + |
| 113 | +In case of federated Identities there it is possible that groups on the IdP |
| 114 | +side do not match groups on the cloud provider side. In addition to that there |
| 115 | +might be a need to combine federated and local users. This would only be |
| 116 | +possible when groups are managed by the OpenStack. |
| 117 | + |
| 118 | +It is advised to keep user groups as mapped entities between external systems |
| 119 | +of CSP and Keystone. Upon user login (or using SCIM) user group relation may be |
| 120 | +synchronized between both platforms. |
| 121 | + |
| 122 | +#### Project deletion |
| 123 | + |
| 124 | +As described above project deletion may be implemented differently by CSPs. |
| 125 | +There are few ways of achieving that: |
| 126 | + |
| 127 | +- Forbid project deletion when resources (i.e. VMs) are still provisioned |
| 128 | +inside of those projects. This scenario assumes that the customer is |
| 129 | +responsible for cleaning projects before their deletion. |
| 130 | + |
| 131 | +- Automatically purge all project resources by the CSP when project deletion |
| 132 | +request is received. In this scenario CSP is implementing custom functionality |
| 133 | +to delete all resources before deleting the project. |
| 134 | + |
| 135 | +- Leave orphant resources. In this scenario project is being deleted by the API |
| 136 | +with custom cleanup procedures being responsible for dropping orphant resources. |
| 137 | + |
| 138 | +Leaving orphant resources MAY NOT be allowed. |
| 139 | + |
| 140 | +Forbidding project deletion making customer responsible for the cleanup SHOULD |
| 141 | +be preferred since it allows preventing the accidental deletion of the |
| 142 | +resources. Supplementary methods for purging project resources MAY be offered by |
| 143 | +the CSP. |
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