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feat: Rework domain-manager standard
Life shows that not all CSPs are capable to adopt the domain manager requirement due to certain architecture decisions or security requirement. Suggest a rework that splits requirements into mandatory and recommended. Signed-off-by: Artem Goncharov <[email protected]>
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--- | ||
title: Domain Manager adoption notes | ||
type: Standard | ||
track: IAM | ||
status: Draft | ||
replaces: scs-0302-v1-domain-manager-role.md | ||
--- | ||
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## Introduction | ||
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After the domain manager persona has been implemented certain issues in the | ||
standard adoption and verification started being raised by CSPs: | ||
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- Not every CSP is using domains to separate customers. | ||
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- CSP may rely on the Identity federation in which case it is impossible or is | ||
prohibited to manage identities on OpenStack side (OpenStack is a service | ||
provider and not an identity provider). | ||
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- CSP may customize authorization policies in a different way so that domain | ||
manager can not be implemented by simply reusing the upstream implementation. | ||
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As such simple enforcement of the Domain Manager persona can not be achieved. | ||
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This standard clarifies base standard and splits requirements into recommended | ||
and mandatory to provide better granularity while still giving guidance with | ||
the goal to provide a smooth user experience for the end users. | ||
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Requiring customer to use CSP specific APIs to manage identity data is | ||
contradicting with the idea of certification as such. It hinders customers from | ||
having a smooth user experience across different cloud providers forcing them | ||
to adapt their management strategies on such clouds. Moreover it represent a | ||
lock-in what is contradicting with the idea of SovereignCloudStack. | ||
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### Mandatory capabilities | ||
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#### Assign roles to users/group on projects/domain | ||
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One of the main initial concerns of the Domain Manager was the ability of the | ||
customer to manage user permissions in a self-service manner. OpenStack | ||
Keystone provides an easy possibility to smoothly integrate role assignments | ||
with arbitrary external systems in a transparent way (a role assignment backend | ||
plugin can be provided to persist assignments in any external system). As such | ||
this capability MUST be supported by the CSP using OpenStack APIs or role | ||
assignments. | ||
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#### Project creation | ||
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Another important requirement was to provide self-service capability for | ||
customers to create projects as desired without requesting CSP support. This | ||
capability MUST be available using native cloud APIs. | ||
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#### Project editing | ||
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Customer must be able to activate or deactivate project access without | ||
requesting CSP support. This capability provides possibility to temporarily | ||
disable users to authorize into certain project by modifying`enabled` property | ||
of the project. Further control of the project name, description, options and | ||
tags MUST be provided to the customer using native Keystone API. | ||
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:::info | ||
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Project deletion using Keystone API is not mandatory since CSP may have certain | ||
expectations on the resources cleanup. This requirement is described in detail | ||
in a dedicated chapter. | ||
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::: | ||
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### Recommended capabilities | ||
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Relying on the Identity federation conceptually changes ways of identity | ||
resource management. This makes it impossible to fulfill them as MUST | ||
requirements. This chapter describes remaining capabilities of the initial | ||
Domain Manager as SHOULD implement. | ||
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#### Domains usage | ||
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It is strongly suggested to rely on the Domain concept of Keystone to implement | ||
multi-tenancy. | ||
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Usage of domains by itself allows to implement form of self-service management | ||
by the customer. Only identity resources are owned by domains (with projects | ||
being also identity resources). Other services use projects to for resources | ||
isolation. They do not need to be domain aware. | ||
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Using domains allows implementing [domain | ||
limits](https://docs.openstack.org/keystone/latest/admin/unified-limits.html#domain-limits) | ||
which allow to set a global resources limit for the customer. Without domains | ||
specific limits artificial control of the overall customer consumption must be | ||
implemented. | ||
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#### User management | ||
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User management (creation, activation, deactivation, deletion) SHOULD be | ||
possible using OpenStack APIs. | ||
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When an external IdP is being used (IdP federation) there is still an | ||
expectation that local users may be required by customers. As such creation of | ||
users (pre-creating federated users or regular local users) within customer | ||
domain SHOULD me possible. Keystone does not allow certain operations on | ||
federated users (i.e. password change, MFA, name) as such allowing customers to | ||
manage users using OpenStack APIs should not conflict with any additional | ||
requirements. | ||
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Security requirements on the customer side or on the CSP side to only allow | ||
federated users to consume platform services was used as the limitating factor | ||
forcing degrading of the capability requirement. | ||
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#### Group management | ||
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Management of groups SHOULD be possible using OpenStack APIs. | ||
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In case of federated Identities there it is possible that groups on the IdP | ||
side do not match groups on the cloud provider side. In addition to that there | ||
might be a need to combine federated and local users. This would only be | ||
possible when groups are managed by the OpenStack. | ||
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It is advised to keep user groups as mapped entities between external systems | ||
of CSP and Keystone. Upon user login (or using SCIM) user group relation may be | ||
synchronized between both platforms. | ||
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#### Project deletion | ||
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As described above project deletion may be implemented differently by CSPs. | ||
There are few ways of achieving that: | ||
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- Forbid project deletion when resources (i.e. VMs) are still provisioned | ||
inside of those projects. This scenario assumes that the customer is | ||
responsible for cleaning projects before their deletion. | ||
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- Automatically purge all project resources by the CSP when project deletion | ||
request is received. In this scenario CSP is implementing custom functionality | ||
to delete all resources before deleting the project. | ||
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- Leave orphant resources. In this scenario project is being deleted by the API | ||
with custom cleanup procedures being responsible for dropping orphant resources. | ||
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Leaving orphant resources MAY NOT be allowed. | ||
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Forbidding project deletion making customer responsible for the cleanup SHOULD | ||
be preferred since it allows preventing the accidental deletion of the | ||
resources. Supplementary methods for purging project resources MAY be offered by | ||
the CSP. |