rm some mentions of holders

Author: BasileiosKal

draft-irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures.md

@@ -60,11 +60,11 @@ A digital signature scheme is a fundamental cryptographic primitive that is used
 
 Beyond the core properties of a digital signature scheme, the BBS signatures and proofs provide multiple additional unique properties. Three key ones are:
 
-**Selective Disclosure** - The scheme allows a signer to sign multiple messages and produce a single -constant size- output signature. A holder/Prover then possessing the messages and the signature can generate a proof whereby they can choose which messages to disclose, while revealing no-information about the undisclosed messages. The proof itself guarantees the integrity and authenticity of the disclosed messages (e.g. that they were originally signed by the signer).
+**Selective Disclosure** - The scheme allows a signer to sign multiple messages and produce a single -constant size- output signature. A Prover then possessing the messages and the signature can generate a proof whereby they can choose which messages to disclose, while revealing no-information about the undisclosed messages. The proof itself guarantees the integrity and authenticity of the disclosed messages (e.g. that they were originally signed by the signer).
 
 **Unlinkable Proofs** - The proofs generated by the scheme are zero-knowledge, proofs-of-knowledge of the signature, meaning a verifying party in receipt of a proof is unable to determine which signature was used to generate the proof, removing a common source of correlation. In general, each BBS proof is indistinguishable from random even if generated from the same signature.
 
-**Proof of Possession** - The proofs generated by the scheme prove to a verifier that the party who generated the proof (holder/Prover) was in possession of a signature without revealing it. The scheme also supports binding a presentation header to the generated proof. The presentation header can include arbitrary information such as a cryptographic nonce, an audience/domain identifier and or time based validity information (for more details on the presentation header, see (#header-and-presentation-header-usage)).
+**Proof of Possession** - The proofs generated by the scheme prove to a verifier that the party who generated the proof (Prover) was in possession of a signature without revealing it. The scheme also supports binding a presentation header to the generated proof. The presentation header can include arbitrary information such as a cryptographic nonce, an audience/domain identifier and or time based validity information (for more details on the presentation header, see (#header-and-presentation-header-usage)).
 
 Refer to the (#use-cases) for an elaboration on situations where these properties are useful.
 
@@ -1639,9 +1639,9 @@ Outputs:
 Procedure:
 
 1. W = octets_to_point_g2(PK)
-2. If W is INVALID, return INVALID
+2. if W is INVALID, return INVALID
 3. if subgroup_check_G2(W) is INVALID, return INVALID
-4. If W == Identity_G2, return INVALID
+4. if W == Identity_G2, return INVALID
 5. return W
 ```
 
@@ -2532,7 +2532,7 @@ BBS Signatures ofter an alternative model that solves the same problems that pro
 
 ## Selectively Disclosure Enabled Identity Credentials
 
-BBS signatures when applied to the problem space of identity credentials can help to enhance user privacy. For example a digital drivers license that is cryptographically signed with a BBS signature, allows the holder or subject of the license to disclose different claims from their drivers license to different parties. Furthermore, the unlinkable presentations property of proofs generated by the scheme remove an important possible source of correlation for the holder across multiple presentations.
+BBS signatures when applied to the problem space of identity credentials can help to enhance user privacy. For example a digital drivers license that is cryptographically signed with a BBS signature, allows the holder or subject of the license (acting as the Prover of the BBS scheme) to disclose different claims from their drivers license to different parties. Furthermore, the unlinkable presentations property of proofs generated by the scheme remove an important possible source of correlation for the holder across multiple presentations.
 
 # Additional Test Vectors