diff --git a/rules/integrations/aws/defense_evasion_iam_account_password_policy_deleted.toml b/rules/integrations/aws/defense_evasion_iam_account_password_policy_deleted.toml
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+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2026/06/18"
+integration = ["aws"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2026/06/18"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Identifies deletion of the AWS account password policy via DeleteAccountPasswordPolicy. The account password policy
+enforces minimum password requirements (length, complexity, rotation, and reuse) for all IAM users in the account.
+Deleting it removes those requirements account-wide, weakening authentication and easing follow-on credential-based
+attacks. This is an account-level change that legitimately occurs only during deliberate administration, so its deletion
+by an unexpected principal warrants review.
+"""
+false_positives = [
+    """
+    Identity and platform teams or infrastructure-as-code may delete or replace the account password policy during
+    governance changes. Verify the principal in `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn` against approved change records, and
+    confirm whether a replacement policy was applied shortly after. Known administration roles and automation can be
+    excluded after validation.
+    """,
+]
+from = "now-6m"
+index = ["logs-aws.cloudtrail-*"]
+language = "kuery"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "AWS IAM Account Password Policy Deleted"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating AWS IAM Account Password Policy Deleted
+
+The account password policy is an account-wide control that sets minimum password length, character complexity, maximum age, and reuse-prevention for all IAM users. `DeleteAccountPasswordPolicy` removes it entirely, reverting the account to no enforced password requirements — which weakens authentication and can facilitate credential attacks or mask weak credentials created later. Because this is a single, account-level, high-impact change, it should be deliberate and rare.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Identify the actor in `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn`, `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.type`, and `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.session_context.session_issuer.arn`, and review `source.ip` / `user_agent.original`.
+- Determine whether a replacement policy was set shortly after (`UpdateAccountPasswordPolicy`) or whether the account was left with no policy.
+- Confirm whether the change aligns with an approved governance change.
+- Correlate with recent activity by the same principal, such as creation of IAM users or login profiles, or other defense-evasion actions (CloudTrail/logging changes) that may indicate a broader effort to weaken controls.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Approved governance or infrastructure-as-code may delete/replace the policy. Confirm the change is expected and exclude known administration roles or automation on `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn` after validation.
+- Note: AWS GuardDuty also surfaces account password policy changes via `Stealth:IAMUser/PasswordPolicyChange`; correlate if GuardDuty is enabled.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- If the deletion is unauthorized, restore an appropriate account password policy (`UpdateAccountPasswordPolicy`) that meets your organization's standards, and review any IAM users or login profiles created while no policy was enforced.
+- Rotate or restrict credentials for the principal if compromise is suspected, and constrain `iam:DeleteAccountPasswordPolicy` and `iam:UpdateAccountPasswordPolicy` to a small set of trusted administrators.
+
+"""
+references = [
+    "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_passwords_account-policy.html",
+    "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteAccountPasswordPolicy.html",
+]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "283f6c2a-9811-4239-9a40-52b066c67f99"
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Cloud",
+    "Domain: Identity",
+    "Data Source: AWS",
+    "Data Source: Amazon Web Services",
+    "Data Source: AWS IAM",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "query"
+
+query = '''
+data_stream.dataset: "aws.cloudtrail"
+    and event.provider: "iam.amazonaws.com"
+    and event.action: "DeleteAccountPasswordPolicy"
+    and event.outcome: "success"
+    and not aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.type: "AWSService"
+    and not user_agent.original: (*terraform* or *pulumi* or *ansible*)
+    and not aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn: (*terraform* or *pulumi* or *ansible*)
+    and not source.address: ("cloudformation.amazonaws.com" or "servicecatalog.amazonaws.com")
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1556"
+name = "Modify Authentication Process"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/"
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0005"
+name = "Defense Evasion"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
+
+[rule.investigation_fields]
+field_names = [
+    "@timestamp",
+    "user.name",
+    "user_agent.original",
+    "source.ip",
+    "aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn",
+    "aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.type",
+    "aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.access_key_id",
+    "aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.session_context.session_issuer.arn",
+    "aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters",
+    "event.action",
+    "event.outcome",
+    "cloud.account.id",
+    "cloud.region",
+]
+