interop: Topology and Tx Flow for Interop Chain Operation (#218)

* interop: design doc for topology

Design doc that is meant to define clearly the topology for a cloud
deployment of an OP Stack cluster. This is not meant to define the
only way to deploy a cluster, but is the architecture that we will
do our security review against to ensure that it is not possible to
attack a cluster.

* typo: fix

Co-authored-by: Axel Kingsley <[email protected]>

* Add Host Redundancy Topic

* Editorial Pass

* Unsaved edits

* Add Conductor Action Item

* Explicit op-geth mention

---------

Co-authored-by: Axel Kingsley <[email protected]>

Author: tynes

protocol/interop-topology.md

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+# Purpose
+
+<!-- This section is also sometimes called “Motivations” or “Goals”. -->
+
+<!-- It is fine to remove this section from the final document,
+but understanding the purpose of the doc when writing is very helpful. -->
+
+This document exists to drive consensus and act on a reference of the preferred topology
+of a cloud deployment of an interop enabled OP Stack cluster.
+
+# Summary
+
+The creation of Interop transactions opens Optimistim Networks to new forms of undesierable activity.
+Specifically, including an interop transaction carries two distinct risks:
+- If an interop transaction is included which is *invalid*, the block which contains it is invalid too,
+and must be replaced, causing a reorg.
+- If the block building and publishing system spends too much time validating an interop transaction,
+callers may exploit this effort to create DOS conditions on the network, where the chain is stalled or slowed.
+
+The new component `op-supervisor` serves to efficiently compute and index cross-safety information across all chains
+in a dependency set. However, we still need to decide on the particular arrangement of components,
+and the desired flow for a Tx to satisfy a high degree of correctness without risking networks stalls.
+
+In this document we will propose the desired locations and schedule for validating transactions for high correctness
+and low impact. We will also propose a desired arrangement of hosts to maximize redundancy in the event that
+some component *does* fail.
+
+# Problem Statement + Context
+
+Breaking the problem into two smaller parts:
+
+## TX Flow - Design for Correctness, Latency
+It is a goal to remove as many sync, blocking operations from the hot path of
+the block builder as possible. Validating an interop cross chain transaction
+requires a remote RPC request to the supervisor. Having this as part of the hot
+path introduces a denial of service risk. Specifically, we do not want to have so
+many interop transactions in a block that it takes longer than the blocktime
+to build a block.
+
+To prevent this sort of issue, we want to move the validation on interop
+transactions to as early as possible in the process, so the hot path of the block builder
+only needs to focus on including transactions.
+
+For context, a cross chain transaction is defined in the [specs](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/85966e9b809e195d9c22002478222be9c1d3f562/specs/interop/overview.md#interop). Any reference
+to the supervisor means [op-supervisor](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/design-docs/blob/d732352c2b3e86e0c2110d345ce11a20a49d5966/protocol/supervisor-dataflow.md).
+
+## Redundancy - Design for Maximum Redundancy
+It is a goal to ensure that there are no single points of failure in the network infrastructure that runs an interop network.
+To that end, we need to organize hosts such that sequencers and supervisors may go down without an interruption.
+
+This should include both Sequencers, arranged with Conductors, as well as redundancy on the Supervisors themselves.
+
+# Proposed Solutions
+
+## TX Ingress Flow
+There are multiple checks we can establish for inflowing Tx to prevent excess work (a DOS vector) from reaching the Supervisor.
+
+### `proxyd`
+
+We can update `proxyd` to validate interop messages on cloud ingress. It should check against both the indexed
+backend of `op-supervisor` as well as the alternative backend.
+Because interop transactions are defined by their Access List,
+`proxyd` does not have to execute any transactions to make this request.
+This filter will eliminate all interop transactions made in bad faith, as they will be obviously invalid.
+
+It may be prudent for `proxyd` to wait and re-test a transaction after a short timeout (`1s` for example)
+to allow through transactions that are valid against the bleeding edge of chain content. `proxyd` can have its own
+`op-supervisor` and `op-node` cluster (and implicitly, an `op-geth` per `op-node`), specifically to provide cross safety queries without putting any load on other
+parts of the network.
+
+### Sentry Node Mempool Ingress
+
+We can update the EL clients to validate interop transactions on ingress to the mempool. This should be a different
+instance of `op-supervisor` than the one that is used by `proxyd` to reduce the likelihood of a nondeterministic
+bug within `op-supervisor`. See "Host Topology" below for a description of how to arrange this.
+
+### All Nodes Mempool on Interval
+
+We can update the EL clients to validate interop transactions on an interval in the mempool. Generally the mempool
+will revalidate all transactions on each new block, but for an L2 that has 1-2s blocktime, that could be frequent if the
+RPC round-trip of an `op-supervisor` query is too costly.
+
+Instead, the Sequencer (and all other nodes) should validate only on a low frequency interval after ingress.
+The *reasoning* for this is: 
+
+Lets say that it takes 100ms for the transaction to be checked at `proxyd`, checked at the mempool of the sentry node,
+forwarded to the sequencer and pulled into the block builder. The chances of the status of an initiating message
+going from existing to not existing during that timeframe is extremely small. Even if we did check at the block builder,
+it doesn't capture the case of a future unsafe chain reorg happening that causes the message to become invalid.
+Because it is most likely that the remote unsafe reorg comes after the local block is sealed, there is no real
+reason to block the hot path of the chain with the remote lookups. If anything, we would want to coordinate these checks
+with the *remote block builders*, but of course we have no way to actually do this.
+
+### Batching Supervisor Calls
+
+During ingress, transactions are independent and must be checked independently. However, once they've reached the Sequencer
+mempool, transactions can be grouped and batched by presumed block. Depending on the rate of the check, the Sequencer
+can collect all the transactions in the mempool it believes will be in a block soon, and can perform a batch RPC call
+to more effectively filter out transactions. This would allow the call to happen more often without increasing RPC overhead.
+
+### Note on Resource Usage
+
+<!-- What is the resource usage of the proposed solution?
+Does it consume a large amount of computational resources or time? -->
+
+Doing a remote RPC request is always going to be an order of magnitude slower than doing a local lookup.
+Therefore we want to ensure that we can parallelize our remote lookups as much as possible. Block building
+is inherently a single threaded process given that the ordering of the transactions is very important.
+
+## Host Topology / Arrangement
+
+In order to fully validate a Superchain, a Supervisor must be hooked up to one Node per chain (with one Executing Engine behind each).
+We can call this group a "full validation stack" because it contains all the executing parts to validate a Superchain.
+
+In order to have redundancy, we will need multiple Nodes, and also *multiple Supervisors*.
+We should use Conductor to ensure the Sequencers have redundancy as well.
+Therefore, we should arrange the nodes like so:
+
+|             | Chain A | Chain B | Chain C |
+|------------|---------|---------|---------|
+| Supervisor 1 | A1      | B1      | C1      |
+| Supervisor 2 | A2      | B2      | C2      |
+| Supervisor 3 | A3      | B3      | C3      |
+
+In this model, each chain has one Conductor, which joins all the Sequencers for a given network. And each heterogeneous group of Sequencers is joined by a Supervisor.
+This model gives us redundancy for both Sequencers *and* Supervisors. If an entire Supervisor were to go down,
+there are still two full validation stacks processing the chain correctly.
+
+There may need to be additional considerations the Conductor makes in order to determine failover,
+but these are not well defined yet. For example, if the Supervisor of the active Sequencer went down,
+it may be prudent to switch the active Sequencer to one with a functional Supervisor.
+
+## Solution Side-Ideas
+
+Although they aren't strictly related to TX Flow or Redundancy, here are additional ideas to increase the stability
+of a network. These ideas won't be brought forward into the Solution Summary or Action Items.
+
+### `op-supervisor` alternative backend
+
+We add a backend mode to `op-supervisor` that operates specifically by using dynamic calls to `eth_getLogs`
+to validate cross chain messages rather than its local index. This could be accomplished by adding
+new RPC endpoints that do this or could be done with runtime config. When `op-supervisor` runs in this
+mode, it is a "light mode" that only supports `supervisor_validateMessagesV2` and `supervisor_validateAccessList`
+(potentially a subset of their behavior). This would give us a form of "client diversity" with respect
+to validating cross chain messages. This is a low lift way to reduce the likelihood of a forged initiating
+message. A forged initiating message would be tricking the caller into believing that an initiating
+message exists when it actually doesn't, meaning that it could be possible for an invalid executing
+message to finalize.
+
+TODO: feedback to understand what capabilities are possible
+
+
+# Solution Summary
+
+We should establish `op-supervisor` checks of transactions at the following points:
+- On cloud ingress to `proxyd`
+- On ingress to all mempools
+- On regular interval on all mempools
+
+Additionally, regular interval checks should use batch calls which validate at least a block's worth of the mempool
+at a time.
+
+`op-supervisor` checks of transactions should *not* happen at the following points:
+- sequencer node mempool ingress
+- block building (as a synchronous activity)
+
+When we deploy hosts, we should currently use a "Full Validation Set" of one Supervisor plus N Managed nodes,
+to maximize redundancy and independent operation of validators. When Sequencers are deployed, Conductors should manage
+individual Managed Nodes *across* Supervisors.
+
+# Alternatives Considered
+
+## Checking at Block Building Time (Tx Flow Solution)
+
+The main alternative to not validating transactions at the block builder is validating transactions
+at the block builder. We would like to have this feature implemented because it can work for simple networks,
+as well as act as an ultimate fallback to keep interop messaging live, but we do not want to run it as
+part of the happy path.
+
+## Multi-Node (Host Redundancy Solution)
+
+One request that has been made previously is to have "Multi-Node" support. In this model,
+multiple Nodes for a single chain are connected to the same Supervisor. To be clear, the Supervisor software
+*generally* supports this behavior, with a few known edge cases where secondary Nodes won't sync fully.
+
+The reason this solution is not the one being proposed is two-fold:
+- Managing multiple Nodes sync status from a single Supervisor is tricky -- you have to be able to replay
+all the correct data on whatever node is behind, must be able to resolve conflicts between reported blocks,
+and errors on one Node may or may not end up affecting the other Nodes. While this feature has some testing,
+the wide range of possible interplay means we don't have high confidence in Multi-Node as a redundancy solution.
+- Multi-Node is *only* a Node redundancy solution, and the Supervisor managing multiple Nodes is still a single
+point of failure. If the Supervisor fails, *every* Node under it is unable to sync also, so there must *still*
+be a diversification of Node:Supervisor. At the point where we split them up, it makes no sense to have higher quanitities
+than 1:1:1 Node:Chain:Supervisor.
+
+# Risks & Uncertainties
+
+We really need to measure everything to validate our hypothesis on the ideal architecture.
+To validate the ideal architecture, we need to measure it and then try to break it.
+
+Incorrect assumptions, or unexpected emergent behaviors in the network, could result in validation not happening at the right times,
+causing excessive replacement blocks. Conversely, we could also fail to reduce load on the block builder, still leading to slow
+block building or stalls.
+
+Ultimately, this design represents a hypothesis which needs real testing before it can be challenged and updated.
+
+# Action Items from this Document
+- Put the `proxyd` check in place
+- Put an interval check in place in the mempool
+- Remove build-time checks
+- Test RPC performance (data collectable via Grafana)
+- Consider and add Supervisor-health as a trigger for Conductor Leadership Transfer