The gov module is responsible for on-chain governance proposals and voting functionality. Note that this module requires a unique way to change its parameters. gov is active on Cosmos Hub 3 and currently has three parameters with six subkeys that may be modified by governance proposal:
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mindeposit-512000000uatom(micro-ATOMs)maxdepositperiod-1209600000000000(nanoseconds)
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votingperiod-1209600000000000(nanoseconds)
The launch values for each parameter's subkeys are outlined above, but you can verify them yourself.
There is some additional functionality being considered for the development of the governance module.
If you're technically-inclined, these are the technical specifications. If you're looking to create a proposal to change one or more of these parameters, check out this section for formatting.
The minimum deposit required for a proposal to enter the voting period, in micro-ATOMs.
Prior to a governance proposal entering the voting period (ie. for the proposal to be voted upon), there must be at least a minimum number of ATOMs deposited. Anyone may contribute to this deposit. Deposits of passed and failed proposals are returned to the contributors. Deposits are burned when proposals 1) expire, 2) fail to reach quorum, or 3) are vetoed. This parameter subkey value represents the minimum deposit required for a proposal to enter the voting period in micro-ATOMs, where 512000000uatom is equivalent to 512 ATOM.
Decreasing the value of the mindeposit subkey will enable governance proposals to enter the voting period with fewer ATOMs at risk. This will likely increase the volume of new governance proposals.
Increasing the value of the mindeposit subkey will require risking a greater number of ATOMs before governance proposals may enter the voting period. This will likely decrease the volume of new governance proposals.
The maximum amount of time that a proposal can accept deposit contributions before expiring, in nanoseconds.
Prior to a governance proposal entering the voting period, there must be at least a minimum number of ATOMs deposited. This parameter subkey value represents the maximum amount of time that the proposal has to reach the minimum deposit amount before expiring. The maximum amount of time that a proposal can accept deposit contributions before expiring is currently 1209600000000000 nanoseconds or 14 days. If the proposal expires, any deposit amounts will be burned.
Decreasing the value of the maxdepositperiod subkey will decrease the time for deposit contributions to governance proposals. This will likely decrease the time that some proposals remain visible and potentially decrease the likelihood that they will enter the voting period. This may increase the likelihood that proposals will expire and have their deposits burned.
Increasing the value of the maxdepositperiod subkey will extend the time for deposit contributions to governance proposals. This will likely increase the time that some proposals remain visible and potentially increase the likelihood that they will enter the voting period. This may decrease the likelihood that proposals will expire and have their deposits burned.
Currently most network explorers (eg. Hubble, Big Dipper, Mintscan) give the same visibility to proposals in the deposit period as those in the voting period. This means that a proposal with a small deposit (eg. 0.001 ATOM) will have the same visibility as those with a full 512 ATOM deposit in the voting period.
The maximum amount of time that a proposal can accept votes before the voting period concludes, in nanoseconds.
Once a governance proposal enters the voting period, there is a maximum period of time that may elapse before the voting period concludes. This parameter subkey value represents the maximum amount of time that the proposal has to accept votes, which is currently 1209600000000000 nanoseconds or 14 days. If the proposal vote does not reach quorum ((ie. 40% of the network's voting power is participating) before this time, any deposit amounts will be burned and the proposal's outcome will not be considered to be valid. Voters may change their vote any number of times before the voting period ends. This voting period is currently the same for any kind of governance proposal.
Decreasing the value of the votingperiod subkey will decrease the time for voting on governance proposals. This will likely:
- decrease the proportion of the network that participates in voting, and
- decrease the likelihood that quorum will be reached.
Increasing the value of the votingperiod subkey will increase the time for voting on governance proposals. This may:
- increase the proportion of the network that participates in voting, and
- increase the likelihood that quorum will be reached.
Historically, off-chain discussions and engagement appears to be have been greater occurred during the voting period of a governance proposal than when the proposal is posted off-chain as a draft. A non-trivial amount of the voting power has voted in the second week of the voting period. Proposals 23, 19, and 13 each had approximately 80% network participation or more.
The minimum proportion of network voting power required for a governance proposal's outcome to be considered valid.
Quorum is required for the outcome of a governance proposal vote to be considered valid and for deposit contributors to recover their deposit amounts, and this parameter subkey value represents the minimum value for quorum. Voting power, whether backing a vote of 'yes', 'abstain', 'no', or 'no-with-veto', counts toward quorum. If the proposal vote does not reach quorum (ie. 40% of the network's voting power is participating) before this time, any deposit amounts will be burned and the proposal outcome will not be considered to be valid.
Decreasing the value of the quorum subkey will enable a smaller proportion of the network to legitimize the outcome of a proposal. This increases the risk that a decision will be made with a smaller proportion of ATOM-stakers' positions being represented, while decreasing the risk that a proposal will be considered invalid. This will likely decrease the risk of a proposal's deposit being burned.
Increasing the value of the quorum subkey will require a larger proportion of the network to legitimize the outcome of a proposal. This decreases the risk that a decision will be made with a smaller proportion of ATOM-stakers' positions being represented, while increasing the risk that a proposal will be considered invalid. This will likely increase the risk of a proposal's deposit being burned.
A simple majority 'yes' vote (ie. 50% of participating voting power) is required for a governance proposal vote to pass. Though necessary, a simple majority 'yes' vote may not be sufficient to pass a proposal in two scenarios:
- Failure to reach quorum of 40% network power or
- A 'no-with-veto' vote of 33.4% of participating voting power or greater.
If a governance proposal passes, deposit amounts are returned to contributors. If a text-based proposal passes, nothing is enacted automatically, but there is a social expectation that participants will co-ordinate to enact the commitments signalled in the proposal. If a parameter change proposal passes, the protocol parameter will automatically change immediately after the voting period ends, and without the need to run new software. If a community-spend proposal passes, the Community Pool balance will decrease by the number of ATOMs indicated in the proposal and the recipient's address will increase by this same number of ATOMs immediately after the voting period ends.
Decreasing the value of the threshold subkey will decrease the proportion of voting power required to pass a proposal. This may:
- increase the likelihood that a proposal will pass, and
- increase the likelihood that a minority group will effect changes to the network.
Increasing the value of the threshold subkey will increase the proportion of voting power required to pass a proposal. This may:
- decrease the likelihood that a proposal will pass, and
- decrease the likelihood that a minority group will effect changes to the network.
Though a simple majority 'yes' vote (ie. 50% of participating voting power) is required for a governance proposal vote to pass, a 'no-with-veto' vote of 33.4% of participating voting power or greater can override this outcome and cause the proposal to fail. This enables a minority group representing greater than 1/3 of voting power to fail a proposal that would otherwise pass.
Decreasing the value of the veto subkey will decrease the proportion of participating voting power required to veto. This will likely:
- enable a smaller minority group to prevent proposals from passing, and
- decrease the likelihood that contentious proposals will pass.
Increasing the value of the veto subkey will increase the proportion of participating voting power required to veto. This will require a larger minority group to prevent proposals from passing, and will likely increase the likelihood that contentious proposals will pass.
This is useful if you don't have gaiacli installed and don't have a reason to believe that the parameter has changed since the chain launched.
Each parameter may be verified in the chain's genesis file, found here. These are the parameters that the latest Cosmos Hub chain launched with, and will remain so, unless a governance proposal changes them. I've outlined those original values in the Technical Specifications section.
The genesis file is text-based and large. The genesis parameter naming scheme isn't identical to those listed above, so when I search, I put one underscore between upper and lowercase characters, then convert all characters to lowercase.
For example, if I want to search for depositparams, I'll search the genesis file for deposit_params.
You may verify the current parameter values (in case they were modified via governance proposal post-launch) with the gaiacli command-line application. Here are the commands for each:
depositparams-gaiacli q ..--> to do <--
The current documentation only describes the minimum viable product for the governance module. Future improvements may include:
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BountyProposals: If accepted, aBountyProposalcreates an open bounty. TheBountyProposalspecifies how many Atoms will be given upon completion. These Atoms will be taken from thereserve pool. After aBountyProposalis accepted by governance, anybody can submit aSoftwareUpgradeProposalwith the code to claim the bounty. Note that once aBountyProposalis accepted, the corresponding funds in thereserve poolare locked so that payment can always be honored. In order to link aSoftwareUpgradeProposalto an open bounty, the submitter of theSoftwareUpgradeProposalwill use theProposal.LinkedProposalattribute. If aSoftwareUpgradeProposallinked to an open bounty is accepted by governance, the funds that were reserved are automatically transferred to the submitter. -
Complex delegation: Delegators could choose other representatives than their validators. Ultimately, the chain of representatives would always end up to a validator, but delegators could inherit the vote of their chosen representative before they inherit the vote of their validator. In other words, they would only inherit the vote of their validator if their other appointed representative did not vote.
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Better process for proposal review: There would be two parts to
proposal.Deposit, one for anti-spam (same as in MVP) and an other one to reward third party auditors.
The gov module is responsible for the on-chain governance system. In this system, holders of the native staking token of the chain may vote on proposals on a 1-token per 1-vote basis. Next is a list of features the module currently supports:
- Proposal submission: Users can submit proposals with a deposit. Once the minimum deposit is reached, proposal enters voting period
- Vote: Participants can vote on proposals that reached MinDeposit
- Inheritance and penalties: Delegators inherit their validator's vote if they don't vote themselves.
- Claiming deposit: Users that deposited on proposals can recover their deposits if the proposal was accepted OR if the proposal never entered voting period.
The gov module contains the following parameters:
| Key | Type | cosmoshub-3 genesis setting |
|---|---|---|
| depositparams | object | {"min_deposit":[{"denom":"uatom","amount":"512000000"}],"max_deposit_period":"1209600000000000"} |
| Subkeys | ||
| min_deposit | array (coins) | [{"denom":"uatom","amount":"512000000"}] |
| max_deposit_period | string (time ns) | "1209600000000000" |
| Key | Type | cosmoshub-3 genesis setting |
|---|---|---|
| votingparams | object | {"voting_period":"1209600000000000"} |
| Subkey | ||
| voting_period | string (time ns) | "1209600000000000" |
| Key | Type | cosmoshub-3 genesis setting |
|---|---|---|
| depositparams | object | {"min_deposit":[{"denom":"uatom","amount":"512000000"}],"max_deposit_period":"1209600000000000"} |
| Subkeys | ||
| quorum | string (dec) | "0.400000000000000000" |
| threshold | string (dec) | "0.500000000000000000" |
| veto | string (dec) | "0.334000000000000000" |
NOTE: The governance module contains parameters that are objects unlike other modules. If only a subset of parameters are desired to be changed, only they need to be included and not the entire parameter object structure.