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| 1 | +# Credentials in Briolette |
| 2 | + |
| 3 | +There are a number of credentials present throughout briolette, each with its |
| 4 | +own capabilities. |
| 5 | + |
| 6 | + |
| 7 | +## Service certificates |
| 8 | + |
| 9 | +All operator services are expected to operate on top of a normal TLS deployment |
| 10 | +where the client can rely on server authenticity based on the certificates and keys |
| 11 | +held by the server. |
| 12 | + |
| 13 | +None of briolette's trust depends on TLS functioning, it does provide heightened |
| 14 | +assurance against denial of service or service disruption attacks. |
| 15 | + |
| 16 | +## State signing key |
| 17 | + |
| 18 | +The state signing key is the most critical cryptographic key in the system. |
| 19 | +After a system-defined period of time has elapsed, a 'epoch', briolette |
| 20 | +system-wide state is updated. This update includes the current epoch number (a |
| 21 | +monotonically increasing 64-bit integer, usually based on wall-clock time), any |
| 22 | +ticket group numbers that have been temporarily blocked from the system |
| 23 | +(revoked), and the other public keys for the remainder of the system that a |
| 24 | +client, or wallet, device must know: token transfer public key, ticket server |
| 25 | +public key, issuing mint public keys, etc. |
| 26 | + |
| 27 | +The level of trust given to the state signing key enables a compromise between |
| 28 | +in-the-field key rotation with minimal gossip overhead. A secondary signature |
| 29 | +over the extended state (epoch) data may be appropriate to introduce if the |
| 30 | +risk introduced is too high. |
| 31 | + |
| 32 | +### Installation |
| 33 | + |
| 34 | +The initial state signing key is installed on the wallet device by the wallet |
| 35 | +vendor or through an out-of-band installation process. Knowledge of the state |
| 36 | +server (clerk) and the state signing key is all that is required for a |
| 37 | +certified wallet to participate in different briolette systems. |
| 38 | + |
| 39 | +See discussion of the 'Network Access Credential' for more. |
| 40 | + |
| 41 | +### Usage |
| 42 | + |
| 43 | +The state signing key does not need to be online and may be air gapped. The |
| 44 | +data it signs is fixed and well-formed, so the process for using the signing |
| 45 | +key, or keys, may be accompanied by additional software validation both on and |
| 46 | +off the signing infrastructure. The signer operates over the next epoch, a |
| 47 | +bitfield of revoked groups, and the extended epoch data cryptographic hash. |
| 48 | +The extended epoch data contains the all other signing keys, as well as the |
| 49 | +alternative state signing keys. |
| 50 | + |
| 51 | +Epoch updates are not expected in real-time and as such, the generation of |
| 52 | +the new epoch data and signing process may be subject to high levels of |
| 53 | +assurance. |
| 54 | + |
| 55 | +## Network Access Credential (NAC) Issuer Key |
| 56 | + |
| 57 | +Wallet vendors will have at least one NAC issuer key. This key is used to grant |
| 58 | +network access credentials to wallets. The associated group public key must be |
| 59 | +known and accepted by briolette system operators for the credential to be used. |
| 60 | + |
| 61 | +The issuer may require the wallet to have a proprietary key or perform some |
| 62 | +other service to be accepted for credential issuance. |
| 63 | + |
| 64 | +## Network Access Credential (NAC) |
| 65 | + |
| 66 | +The NAC is used by a wallet to connect to briolette operator services and is |
| 67 | +required for acquiring a token transfer credential. |
| 68 | + |
| 69 | +Signatures over requests with epoch-bound basenames may be used to create |
| 70 | +linkable signatures over time periods. This will allow operator services to |
| 71 | +limit requests from any given wallet during a time period without being able |
| 72 | +to uniquely identify that wallet in the future. |
| 73 | + |
| 74 | +## Token Transfer Credential (TTC) Issuer Key |
| 75 | + |
| 76 | +This key is usually held by the system operator and is used to grant token |
| 77 | +transfer credentials to wallets. Wallets will need to request a TTC upon |
| 78 | +setup for a given operator and its request must be authenticated by the |
| 79 | +wallet's NAC with a known NAC group public key. |
| 80 | + |
| 81 | +## Token Transfer Credential (TTC) |
| 82 | + |
| 83 | +The TTC is used by the wallet to send and receive tokens. The wallet holds the |
| 84 | +private key and the credential acts as a "public" key. The credential itself |
| 85 | +is never used directly. Instead it may be randomized prior to use. |
| 86 | + |
| 87 | +Prior to transacting, a wallet must pre-randomize its credential several times. |
| 88 | +It will take these randomized credentials and present them to the ticket clerk |
| 89 | +service (signed with the wallet's NAC). The ticket clerk will return signed |
| 90 | +tickets which may be used as the destination to receive tokens at. |
| 91 | + |
| 92 | +When transferring received tokens, the wallet must use the same randomized |
| 93 | +credential from the signed ticket the token was transferred to when signing the |
| 94 | +transaction. |
| 95 | + |
| 96 | +## Token Signing Key |
| 97 | + |
| 98 | +The token signing key is the minting key. It fixates the token descriptor data |
| 99 | +with its signature and assigns the first recipient of a token. |
| 100 | + |
| 101 | +## Transfer Ticket Signing Key |
| 102 | + |
| 103 | +This key is held by the ticket clerk service and is used to sign transfer tickets |
| 104 | +which are built from randomized TTCs and specific policy attributes, such as |
| 105 | +expiration times. |
| 106 | + |
| 107 | + |
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