smconfig.xml

<!--
  sysmon-config | A Sysmon configuration focused on default high-quality event tracing and easy customization by the community
  Source version:	71 | Date: 2020-01-16
  Source project:	https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config
  Source license:	Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 | You may privatize, fork, edit, teach, publish, or deploy for commercial use - with attribution in the text.

  Fork version:	<N/A>
  Fork author:	<N/A>
  Fork project:	<N/A>
  Fork license:	<N/A>

  REQUIRED: Sysmon version 10.0.4.1 or higher (due to changes in syntax and bug-fixes)
	https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon

  NOTE: To collect Sysmon logs centrally for free, see https://aka.ms/WEF | Command to allow log access to the Network Service:
	wevtutil.exe sl Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational /ca:O:BAG:SYD:(A;;0xf0005;;;SY)(A;;0x5;;;BA)(A;;0x1;;;S-1-5-32-573)(A;;0x1;;;NS)

  NOTE: Do not let the size and complexity of this configuration discourage you from customizing it or building your own.
	This configuration is based around known, high-signal event tracing, and thus appears complicated, but it is only very
	detailed. Significant effort over years has been invested in front-loading as much filtering as possible onto the
	client. This is to make analysis of intrusions possible by hand, and to try to surface anomalous activity as quickly
	as possible to technicians armed only with Event Viewer. Its purpose is to democratize system monitoring for all organizations.

  NOTE: Sysmon is NOT a whitelist solution or HIDS correlation engine, it is a computer change logging tool.
	Do NOT ignore everything possible. Sysmon's purpose is providing context during a threat or problem investigation. Legitimate
	processes are routinely used by threats - do not blindly exclude them. Additionally, be mindful of process-hollowing / imitation.

  NOTE: By default this monitors DNS, which is extremely noisy. If you are starting out on your monitoring journey, just remove that section.
	You can remove DNS events from Event Viewer screen by applying a 'Filter Current View' for event IDs of: -22
	Additionally, if you want to monitor DNS, you should deploy client-side adblocking to reduce lookups. See the DNS section for info.

  NOTE: This configuration is designed for PER-MACHINE installs of Chrome and OneDrive. That moves their binaries out of user-controlled folders.
	Otherwise, attackers could imitate these common applications, and bypass your logging. Below are silent upgrades you can do, no user impact:
	- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/onedrive/per-machine-installation
	- https://cloud.google.com/chrome-enterprise/browser/download/
	- As of 2019-08-25 there is no usermode version of Microsoft Teams.

  NOTE: Sysmon is not hardened against an attacker with admin rights. Additionally, this configuration offers an attacker, willing
	to study it, limited ways to evade some of the logging. If you are in a very high-threat environment, you should consider a broader,
	log-most approach. However, in the vast majority of cases, an attacker will bumble through multiple behavioral traps which
	this configuration monitors, especially in the first minutes. Even APT do not send their A-team unless they know you're hardened.
	5% of the effort gets 95% of the results. APT rely on nobody watching because almost nobody does. Your effort makes the difference.

  NOTE: If you encounter unexplainable event inclusion/exclusion, you may have a second Sysmon instance installed under a different exe filename.
	To clear this, try downloading the latest version and uninstalling with -u force. If it hangs, kill the processes and run it again to cleanup.

  TECHNICAL:
  - Run sysmon.exe -? for a briefing on Sysmon configuration.
  - Sysmon XML cannot use the AMPERSAND sign. Replace it with this: &amp;
  - Sysmon 8+ can track which rule caused an event to be logged through the "RuleName" field.
  - If you only specify exclude for a filtering subsection, everything in that subsection is logged by default.
  - Some Sysmon monitoring abilities are not meant for widely deployed general-purpose use due to performance impact. Depends on environment.
  - Duplicate or overlapping "Include" rules do not result in duplicate events being logged.
  - All characters enclosed by XML tags are always interpreted literally. Sysmon does not support wildcards (*), alternate characters, or RegEx.
  - In registry events, the value name is appended to the full key path with a "\" delimiter. Default key values are named "\(Default)"
  - "Image" is a technical term for a compiled binary file like an EXE or DLL. Also, it can match just the filename, or entire path.
  - "ProcessGuid" and "LoginGuid" are not random, they contain some embedded information. https://gist.github.com/mattifestation/0102042160c9a60b2b847378c0ef70b4

  FILTERING: Filter conditions available for use are: is, is not, contains, excludes, begin with, end with, less than, more than, image
  - The "image" filter is usable on any field. Same as "is" but can either match entire string, or only the text after last "\". Credit: @mattifestation

-->

<Sysmon schemaversion="4.50">
	<!--SYSMON META CONFIG-->
	<HashAlgorithms>md5,sha256,IMPHASH</HashAlgorithms> <!-- Both MD5 and SHA256 are the industry-standard algorithms for identifying files -->
	<CheckRevocation/> <!-- Check loaded drivers, log if their code-signing certificate has been revoked, in case malware stole one to sign a kernel driver -->

	<!-- <ImageLoad/> --> <!-- Would manually force-on ImageLoad monitoring, even without configuration below. Included only documentation. -->
	<!-- <ProcessAccessConfig/> --> <!-- Would manually force-on ProcessAccess monitoring, even without configuration below. Included only documentation. -->
	<!-- <PipeMonitoringConfig/> --> <!-- Would manually force-on PipeCreated / PipeConnected events, even without configuration below. Included only documentation. -->

	<EventFiltering>

	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 1 : PROCESS CREATION [ProcessCreate]-->
		<!--COMMENT:	All processes launched will be logged, except for what matches a rule below. It's best to be as specific as possible,
			to avoid user-mode executables imitating other process names to avoid logging, or if malware drops files in an existing directory.
			Ultimately, you must weigh CPU time checking many detailed rules, against the risk of malware exploiting the blindness created.
			Beware of Masquerading, where attackers imitate the names and paths of legitimate tools. Ideally, you'd use both file path and
			code signatures to validate, but Sysmon does not support that. Look into AppLocker/WindowsDeviceGuard for whitelisting support. -->

		<!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessID, Image, FileVersion, Description, Product, Company, CommandLine, CurrentDirectory, User, LogonGuid, LogonId, TerminalSessionId, IntegrityLevel, Hashes, ParentProcessGuid, ParentProcessId, ParentImage, ParentCommandLine, RuleName-->
	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
		<ProcessCreate onmatch="exclude">
			<!--SECTION: Microsoft Windows-->
			<CommandLine condition="begin with">C:\Windows\freeEDR</CommandLine> <!--Windows-->
			<ParentCommandLine condition="begin with">C:\Windows\freeEDR</ParentCommandLine>
			<ParentCommandLine condition="is">C:\ProgramData\ZeroTier\One\zerotier-one_x64.exe</ParentCommandLine>
			<ParentCommandLine condition="begin with">C:\Windows\System32\icacls.exe "C:\ProgramData\ZeroTier\One\networks.d</ParentCommandLine>
            	</ProcessCreate>
	</RuleGroup>
	
	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 2 : FILE CREATION TIME RETROACTIVELY CHANGED IN THE FILESYSTEM [FileCreateTime]-->
		<!--COMMENT:	[ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1099 ] -->

		<!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image, TargetFilename, CreationUtcTime, PreviousCreationUtcTime-->
	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
		<FileCreateTime onmatch="include">
			<Image name="T1099" condition="begin with">C:\Users</Image> <!--Look for timestomping in user area, usually nothing should be doing that here-->
			<TargetFilename name="T1099" condition="end with">.exe</TargetFilename> <!--Look for backdated executables anywhere-->
			<Image name="T1099" condition="begin with">\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy</Image> <!--Nothing should be written here | Credit: @SBousseaden [ https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1133030955407630336 ] -->
		</FileCreateTime>
	</RuleGroup>

	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
		<FileCreateTime onmatch="exclude">
			<Image condition="image">OneDrive.exe</Image> <!--OneDrive constantly changes file times-->
			<Image condition="image">C:\Windows\system32\backgroundTaskHost.exe</Image>
			<Image condition="contains">setup</Image> <!--Ignore setups-->
			<Image condition="contains">install</Image> <!--Ignore setups-->
			<Image condition="contains">Update\</Image> <!--Ignore setups-->
			<Image condition="end with">redist.exe</Image> <!--Ignore setups-->
			<Image condition="is">msiexec.exe</Image> <!--Ignore setups-->
			<Image condition="is">TrustedInstaller.exe</Image> <!--Ignore setups-->
			<TargetFilename condition="contains">\NVIDIA\NvBackend\ApplicationOntology\</TargetFilename> <!--NVIDIA GeForce Experience Application Ontology, 1000's of events in user profile-->
		</FileCreateTime>
	</RuleGroup>

	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 3 : NETWORK CONNECTION INITIATED [NetworkConnect]-->
		<!--COMMENT:	By default this configuration takes a very conservative approach to network logging, limited to only extremely high-signal events.-->
		<!--COMMENT:	[ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control ] [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Exfiltration ] [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Lateral_Movement ] -->
		<!--TECHNICAL:	For the DestinationHostname, Sysmon uses the GetNameInfo API, which will often not have any information, and may just be a CDN. This is NOT reliable for filtering.-->
		<!--TECHNICAL:	For the DestinationPortName, Sysmon uses the GetNameInfo API for the friendly name of ports you see in logs.-->
		<!--TECHNICAL:	These exe do not initiate their connections, and thus includes do not work in this section: BITSADMIN NLTEST-->
		
		<!-- https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/APT-Log-Analysis-Tracking-Attack-Tools-by-Audit-Policy-and-Sysmon.pdf -->

		<!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image, User, Protocol, Initiated, SourceIsIpv6, SourceIp, SourceHostname, SourcePort, SourcePortName, DestinationIsIpV6, DestinationIp, DestinationHostname, DestinationPort, DestinationPortName-->
	
	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
		<NetworkConnect onmatch="exclude">
			<!--SECTION: Microsoft-->
			<Image condition="image">System</Image>
			<Image condition="end with">unknown process></Image>
			<Image condition="begin with">c:\windows\systemapps\microsoft.windows.search</Image>
			<Image condition="image">c:\programdata\zerotier\one\zerotier-one_x64.exe</Image>
			<Image condition="begin with">C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\</Image>
			<Image condition="end with">AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe</Image> <!--Microsoft: Teams-->
			<DestinationHostname condition="end with">.microsoft.com</DestinationHostname> <!--Microsoft:Update delivery-->
			<DestinationHostname condition="end with">microsoft.com.akadns.net</DestinationHostname> <!--Microsoft:Update delivery-->
			<DestinationHostname condition="end with">microsoft.com.nsatc.net</DestinationHostname> <!--Microsoft:Update delivery-->
			<!--Section: Loopback Addresses-->
			<DestinationIp condition="is">127.0.0.1</DestinationIp> <!--Credit @ITProPaul-->
			<DestinationIp condition="begin with">fe80:0:0:0</DestinationIp> <!--Credit @ITProPaul-->
		</NetworkConnect>
	</RuleGroup>

	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 4 : RESERVED FOR SYSMON SERVICE STATUS MESSAGES-->

		<!--DATA: UtcTime, State, Version, SchemaVersion-->
		<!--Cannot be filtered.-->

	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 5 : PROCESS ENDED [ProcessTerminate]-->
		<!--COMMENT:	Useful data in building infection timelines.-->

		<!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image-->


	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 6 : DRIVER LOADED INTO KERNEL [DriverLoad]-->
		<!--COMMENT:	Because drivers with bugs can be used to escalate to kernel permissions, be extremely selective
			about what you exclude from monitoring. Low event volume, little incentive to exclude.
			[ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1014 ] -->
		<!--TECHNICAL:	Sysmon will check the signing certificate revocation status of any driver you don't exclude.-->

		<!--DATA: UtcTime, ImageLoaded, Hashes, Signed, Signature, SignatureStatus-->
	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
		<DriverLoad onmatch="exclude">
			<Signature condition="contains">microsoft</Signature> <!--Exclude signed Microsoft drivers-->
			<Signature condition="contains">windows</Signature> <!--Exclude signed Microsoft drivers-->
			<Signature condition="begin with">Intel </Signature> <!--Exclude signed Intel drivers-->
		</DriverLoad>
	</RuleGroup>

	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 7 : DLL (IMAGE) LOADED BY PROCESS [ImageLoad]-->
		<!--COMMENT:	Can cause high system load, disabled by default.-->
		<!--COMMENT:	[ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1073 ] [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1038 ] [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1034 ] -->

		<!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image, ImageLoaded, Hashes, Signed, Signature, SignatureStatus-->
	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
		<ImageLoad onmatch="exclude">
			<Signature condition="contains">microsoft</Signature> <!--Exclude signed Microsoft drivers-->
		</ImageLoad>
	</RuleGroup>

	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 8 : REMOTE THREAD CREATED [CreateRemoteThread]-->
		<!--COMMENT:	Monitor for processes injecting code into other processes. Often used by malware to cloak their actions. Also when Firefox loads Flash.
		[ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1055 ] -->

		<!--DATA: UtcTime, SourceProcessGuid, SourceProcessId, SourceImage, TargetProcessId, TargetImage, NewThreadId, StartAddress, StartModule, StartFunction-->
	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
		<CreateRemoteThread onmatch="exclude">
			<!--COMMENT: Exclude mostly-safe sources and log anything else.-->
			<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\wbem\WmiPrvSE.exe</SourceImage>
			<SourceImage condition="begin with">C:\windows\freeEDR\</SourceImage>
			<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe</SourceImage>
			<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\wininit.exe</SourceImage>
			<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\csrss.exe</SourceImage>
			<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\services.exe</SourceImage>
			<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exe</SourceImage>
			<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\audiodg.exe</SourceImage>
			<StartModule condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\kernel32.dll</StartModule>
			<TargetImage condition="is">C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe</TargetImage>
		</CreateRemoteThread>
	</RuleGroup>

	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 9 : RAW DISK ACCESS [RawAccessRead]-->
		<!--EVENT 9: "RawAccessRead detected"-->
		<!--COMMENT:	Can cause high system load, disabled by default.-->
		<!--COMMENT:	Monitor for raw sector-level access to the disk, often used to bypass access control lists or access locked files.
			Disabled by default since including even one entry here activates this component. Reward/performance/rule maintenance decision.
			Encourage you to experiment with this feature yourself. [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1067 ] -->
		<!--COMMENT:	You will likely want to set this to a full capture on domain controllers, where no process should be doing raw reads.-->

		<!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image, Device-->
	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
		<RawAccessRead onmatch="include">
			<!--NOTE: Using "include" with no rules means nothing in this section will be logged-->
		</RawAccessRead>
	</RuleGroup>

	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 10 : INTER-PROCESS ACCESS [ProcessAccess]-->
		<!--EVENT 10: "Process accessed"-->
		<!--COMMENT:	Can cause high system load, disabled by default.-->
		<!--COMMENT:	Monitor for processes accessing other process' memory.-->

		<!--DATA: UtcTime, SourceProcessGuid, SourceProcessId, SourceThreadId, SourceImage, TargetProcessGuid, TargetProcessId, TargetImage, GrantedAccess, CallTrace-->
	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
		<ProcessAccess onmatch="exclude"> 
			<GrantedAccess condition="is">0x1</GrantedAccess> 
			<!-- PROCESS_TERMINATE --> 
			<GrantedAccess condition="is">0x40</GrantedAccess> 
			<!-- PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE --> 
			<GrantedAccess condition="is">0x400</GrantedAccess> 
			<!-- PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION --> 
			<GrantedAccess condition="is">0x1000</GrantedAccess> 
			<!-- PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION --> 
			<GrantedAccess condition="is">0x1040</GrantedAccess> 
			<!-- PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION | PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE --> 
			<GrantedAccess condition="is">0x1400</GrantedAccess> 
			<!-- PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION | PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION --> 
			<GrantedAccess condition="is">0x1440</GrantedAccess> 
			<!-- PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION | PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION | PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE --> 
			<GrantedAccess condition="is">0x100000</GrantedAccess> 
			<!-- SYNCHRONIZE--> <GrantedAccess condition="is">0x100040</GrantedAccess> 
			<!-- SYNCHRONIZE | PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE--> <GrantedAccess condition="is">0x100400</GrantedAccess> 
			<!-- SYNCHRONIZE | PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION -->
			<GrantedAccess condition="is">0x101000</GrantedAccess> 
			<!-- SYNCHRONIZE | PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION --> 
			<GrantedAccess condition="is">0x101040</GrantedAccess> 
			<GrantedAccess condition="is">0x101400</GrantedAccess> 
			<!-- SYNCHRONIZE | PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION | PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION --> 
			<GrantedAccess condition="is">0x101440</GrantedAccess> 
			<GrantedAccess condition="is">0x101001</GrantedAccess> 
			<!-- SYNCHRONIZE | PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION | PROCESS_TERMINATE --> 
			<SourceImage condition="begin with">c:\Windows\System32\</SourceImage> 
			<!-- to exclude when the source image is a system process or windows process, its more interested to check if someone accessing or writing to a system process --> 
			<SourceImage condition="begin with">c:\Windows\sysWOW64\</SourceImage>
			 <!-- to exclude when the source image is a system process or windows process, its more interested to check if someone accessing or writing to a system process --> 
			<SourceImage condition="is">System</SourceImage> <!-- to exclude when the source image is a system process or windows process, its more interested to check if someone accessing or writing to a system process --> 
			<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Windows\Sysmon.exe</SourceImage> 
			<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Windows\Sysmon64.exe</SourceImage> 
			<SourceImage condition="begin with">C:\Windows\freeEDR\</SourceImage>
			<SourceImage condition="begin with">C:\Program Files\Microsoft Visual Studio\</SourceImage> 
			<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE</SourceImage> 
			<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Program Files\Synaptics\SynTP\SynTPEnh.exe</SourceImage> 
			<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe</SourceImage> 
			<SourceImage condition="is">c:\program files\windows defender\MpCmdRun.exe</SourceImage> 
			<SourceImage condition="begin with">C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\platform\</SourceImage> 
			<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Program Files\Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection\MsSense.exe</SourceImage> 
			<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\MsMpEng.exe</SourceImage> 
			<SourceImage condition="is">c:\program files (x86)\google\update\googleupdate.exe</SourceImage> 
			<SourceImage condition="is">c:\program files\google\update\googleupdate.exe</SourceImage> 
			<SourceImage condition="begin with">C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Update\</SourceImage> 
			<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe</SourceImage> 
			<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe</SourceImage> 
			<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Program Files (x86)\Cisco\Cisco HostScan\bin\cscan.exe</SourceImage> 
			<SourceImage condition="begin with">C:\Program Files (x86)\Cisco\Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client\</SourceImage> 
			<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe</SourceImage> 
			<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\integration\integrator.exe</SourceImage> 
			<SourceImage condition="begin with">C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\Updates\</SourceImage> 
			<SourceImage condition="begin with">C:\ProgramData\WebEx\webex\</SourceImage> 
			<SourceImage condition="begin with">C:\Program Files\NVIDIA Corporation\Display.NvContainer\</SourceImage> 
			<SourceImage condition="begin with">C:\WINDOWS\SoftwareDistribution\Download\Install\</SourceImage> 
			<SourceImage condition="end with">\appdata\local\webex\webex\applications\WebexMTA.exe</SourceImage> 
			<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Program Files\LRS\VPSX Printer Driver Management\ndrvu.exe</SourceImage> 
			<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Program Files\Lenovo\iMController\PluginHost\Lenovo.Modern.ImController.PluginHost.Device.exe</SourceImage> 
			<SourceImage condition="is">c:\program files (x86)\cisco\cisco hostscan\bin\ciscod.exe</SourceImage> 
			<SourceImage condition="begin with">C:\Program Files\Realtek\Audio\HDA\</SourceImage> 
			<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Intune Management Extension\agentexecutor.exe</SourceImage> 
			<TargetImage condition="begin with">C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\</TargetImage> 
			<TargetImage condition="begin with">C:\Program Files\Realtek\Audio\HDA\</TargetImage> 
			<SourceImage condition="is">c:\program files (x86)\bigfix enterprise\bes client\besclient.exe</SourceImage> 
			<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Program Files (x86)\BigFix Enterprise\BES Client\BESClientHelper.exe</SourceImage> 
			<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Program Files\BigFix Enterprise\BES Client\BESClient.exe</SourceImage> 
			<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Program Files\BigFix Enterprise\BES Client\BESClientHelper.exe</SourceImage> 
		</ProcessAccess>
	</RuleGroup>

	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 11 : FILE CREATED [FileCreate]-->
		<!--EVENT 11: "File created"-->
		<!--NOTE:	Other filesystem "minifilters" can make it appear to Sysmon that some files are being written twice. This is not a Sysmon issue, per Mark Russinovich.-->
		<!--NOTE:	You may not see files detected by antivirus. Other filesystem minifilters, like antivirus, can act before Sysmon receives the alert a file was written.-->

		<!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image, TargetFilename, CreationUtcTime-->
	

	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
		<FileCreate onmatch="exclude">
			<TargetFilename condition="begin with">C:\Windows\freeEDR\</TargetFilename> <!-- Windows: Temp files by DrvInst.exe-->
   			<Image condition="is">C:\Program Files (x86)\EMET 5.5\EMET_Service.exe</Image> <!--Microsoft:EMET: Writes to C:\Windows\AppPatch\-->
			<!--SECTION: Microsoft:Office:Click2Run-->
			<Image condition="is">C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeC2RClient.exe</Image> <!-- Microsoft:Office Click2Run-->
			<!--SECTION: Windows-->
			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\smss.exe</Image> <!-- Windows: Session Manager SubSystem: Creates swapfile.sys,pagefile.sys,hiberfile.sys-->
			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\CompatTelRunner.exe</Image> <!-- Windows: Windows 10 app, creates tons of cache files-->
			<Image condition="is">\\?\C:\Windows\system32\wbem\WMIADAP.EXE</Image> <!-- Windows: WMI Performance updates-->
			<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\mobsync.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Network file syncing-->
			<TargetFilename condition="begin with">C:\Windows\system32\DriverStore\Temp\</TargetFilename> <!-- Windows: Temp files by DrvInst.exe-->
			<TargetFilename condition="begin with">C:\Windows\system32\wbem\Performance\</TargetFilename> <!-- Windows: Created in wbem by WMIADAP.exe-->
			<TargetFilename condition="begin with">C:\Windows\Installer\</TargetFilename> <!--Windows:Installer: Ignore MSI installer files caching-->
			<!--SECTION: Windows:Updates-->
			<TargetFilename condition="begin with">C:\$WINDOWS.~BT\Sources\</TargetFilename> <!-- Windows: Feature updates containing lots of .exe and .sys-->
			<Image condition="begin with">C:\Windows\winsxs\amd64_microsoft-windows</Image> <!-- Windows: Windows update-->
		</FileCreate>
	</RuleGroup>

	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 12 & 13 & 14 : REGISTRY MODIFICATION [RegistryEvent]-->
		<!--EVENT 12: "Registry object added or deleted"-->
		<!--EVENT 13: "Registry value set"-->
		<!--EVENT 14: "Registry objected renamed"-->

		<!--NOTE:	Windows writes hundreds or thousands of registry keys a minute, so just because you're not changing things, doesn't mean these rules aren't being run.-->
		<!--NOTE:	You do not have to spend a lot of time worrying about performance, CPUs are fast, but it's something to consider. Every rule and condition type has a small cost.-->
		<!--NOTE:	"contains" works by finding the first letter, then matching the second, etc, so the first letters should be as low-occurrence as possible.-->
		<!--NOTE:	[ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112 ] -->

		<!--TECHNICAL:	You cannot filter on the "Details" attribute, due to performance issues when very large keys are written, and variety of data formats-->
		<!--TECHNICAL:	Possible prefixes are HKLM, HKCR, and HKU-->
		<!--CRITICAL:	Schema version 3.30 and higher change HKLM\="\REGISTRY\MACHINE\" and HKU\="\REGISTRY\USER\" and HKCR\="\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\" and CurrentControlSet="ControlSet001"-->
		<!--CRITICAL:	Due to a bug, Sysmon versions BEFORE 7.01 may not properly log with the new prefix style for registry keys that was originally introduced in schema version 3.30-->
		<!--NOTE:	Because Sysmon runs as a service, it has no filtering ability for, or concept of, HKCU or HKEY_CURRENT_USER. Use "contains" or "end with" to get around this limitation-->

		<!-- ! CRITICAL NOTE !:	It may appear this section is MISSING important entries, but SOME RULES MONITOR MANY KEYS, so look VERY CAREFULLY to see if something is already covered.
								Sysmon's wildcard monitoring along with highly-tuned generic strings cuts the rulesets down immensely, compared to doing this in other tools.
								For example, most COM hijacking in CLSID's across the registry is covered by a single rule monitoring a InProcServer32 wildcard-->

		<!--DATA: EventType, UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image, TargetObject, Details (can't filter on), NewName (can't filter on)-->
	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
		<RegistryEvent onmatch="include">
			<!--Autorun or Startups-->
				<!--ADDITIONAL REFERENCE: [ http://www.ghacks.net/2016/06/04/windows-automatic-startup-locations/ ] -->
				<!--ADDITIONAL REFERENCE: [ https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https://arsenalrecon.com/downloads/resources/Registry_Keys_Related_to_Autorun.ods ] -->
				<!--ADDITIONAL REFERENCE: [ http://www.silentrunners.org/launchpoints.html ] -->
				<!--ADDITIONAL REFERENCE: [ https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/articles/article.aspx?p=2762082&seqNum=2 ] -->
				<!--ADDITIONAL REFERENCE: [ https://web.archive.org/web/20200116001643/http://scholarworks.rit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1533&context=theses | Understanding malware autostart techniques - Matthew Gottlieb ] -->
			<TargetObject name="T1060,RunKey" condition="contains">CurrentVersion\Run</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Wildcard for Run keys, including RunOnce, RunOnceEx, RunServices, RunServicesOnce [Also covers terminal server] -->
			<TargetObject name="T1060,RunPolicy" condition="contains">Policies\Explorer\Run</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Alternate runs keys | Credit @ion-storm-->
			<TargetObject name="T1484" condition="contains">Group Policy\Scripts</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Group policy scripts-->
			<TargetObject name="T1484" condition="contains">Windows\System\Scripts</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Wildcard for Logon, Loggoff, Shutdown-->
			<TargetObject name="T1060" condition="contains">CurrentVersion\Windows\Load</TargetObject> <!--Windows: [ https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/jj874148.aspx ] -->
			<TargetObject name="T1060" condition="contains">CurrentVersion\Windows\Run</TargetObject> <!--Windows: [ https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/jj874148.aspx ] -->
			<TargetObject name="T1060" condition="contains">CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell</TargetObject> <!--Windows: [ https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms838576(v=winembedded.5).aspx ] -->
			<TargetObject name="T1060" condition="contains">CurrentVersion\Winlogon\System</TargetObject> <!--Windows [ https://www.exterminate-it.com/malpedia/regvals/zlob-dns-changer/118 ] -->
			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Autorun location [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1004 ] [ https://www.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order ] -->
			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell</TargetObject> <!--Windows: [ https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee851671.aspx ] -->
			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Autorun location [ https://www.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order ] -->
			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Drivers32</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Legacy driver loading | Credit @ion-storm -->
			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\BootExecute</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Autorun | Credit @ion-storm | [ https://www.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order ] -->
			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AeDebug</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Automatic program crash debug program [ https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-050712-5453-99&tabid=2 ] -->
			<TargetObject condition="contains">UserInitMprLogonScript</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Legacy logon script environment variable [ http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/11/14/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-18/ ] -->
			<TargetObject name="T1112,ChangeStartupFolderPath" condition="end with">user shell folders\startup</TargetObject> <!--Monitor changes to Startup folder location for monitoring evasion | Credit @SBousseaden-->
			<!--Services-->
			<TargetObject name="T1031,T1050" condition="end with">\ServiceDll</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Points to a service's DLL [ https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-1-introduction-attack-phases-and-windows-services ] -->
			<TargetObject name="T1031,T1050" condition="end with">\ServiceManifest</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Manifest pointing to service's DLL [ https://www.geoffchappell.com/studies/windows/win32/services/svchost/index.htm ] -->
			<TargetObject name="T1031,T1050" condition="end with">\ImagePath</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Points to a service's EXE [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050 ] -->
			<TargetObject name="T1031,T1050" condition="end with">\Start</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Services start mode changes (Disabled, Automatically, Manual)-->
			<!--RDP-->
			<TargetObject name="RDP port change" condition="end with">Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp\PortNumber</TargetObject> <!--Windows: RDP port change under Control [ https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/of-rdp-hijacking-part1-remote-desktop.html ]-->
			<TargetObject name="RDP port change" condition="end with">Control\Terminal Server\fSingleSessionPerUser</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Allow same user to have mutliple RDP sessions, to hide from admin being impersonated-->
			<TargetObject name="ModifyRemoteDesktopState" condition="end with">fDenyTSConnections</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Attacker turning on RDP-->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">LastLoggedOnUser</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Changing last-logged in user-->
			<TargetObject name="ModifyRemoteDesktopPort" condition="end with">RDP-tcp\PortNumber</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Changing RDP port to evade IDS-->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">Services\PortProxy\v4tov4</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Changing RDP port to evade IDS-->
			<!--CLSID launch commands and Default File Association changes-->
			<TargetObject name="T1042" condition="contains">\command\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Sensitive sub-key under file associations and CLSID that map to launch command-->
			<TargetObject name="T1122" condition="contains">\ddeexec\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Sensitive sub-key under file associations and CLSID that map to launch command-->
			<TargetObject name="T1122" condition="contains">{86C86720-42A0-1069-A2E8-08002B30309D}</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Tooltip handler-->
			<TargetObject name="T1042" condition="contains">exefile</TargetObject> <!--Windows Executable handler, to log any changes not already monitored-->
			<!--Windows COM-->
			<TargetObject name="T1122" condition="end with">\InprocServer32\(Default)</TargetObject> <!--Windows:COM Object Hijacking [ https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2014/10/23941-com-object-hijacking-the-discreet-way-of-persistence ] | Credit @ion-storm -->
			<!--Windows shell visual modifications used by malware-->
			<TargetObject name="T1158" condition="end with">\Hidden</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Explorer: Some types of malware try to hide their hidden system files from the user, good signal event -->
			<TargetObject name="T1158" condition="end with">\ShowSuperHidden</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Explorer: Some types of malware try to hide their hidden system files from the user, good signal event [ Example: https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-061811-4341-99&tabid=2 ] -->
			<TargetObject name="T1158" condition="end with">\HideFileExt</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Explorer: Some malware hides file extensions to make diagnosis/disinfection more daunting to novice users -->
			<!--Windows shell hijack and modifications-->
			<TargetObject condition="contains">Classes\*\</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Explorer: [ http://www.silentrunners.org/launchpoints.html ] -->
			<TargetObject condition="contains">Classes\AllFilesystemObjects\</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Explorer: [ http://www.silentrunners.org/launchpoints.html ] -->
			<TargetObject condition="contains">Classes\Directory\</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Explorer: [ https://stackoverflow.com/questions/1323663/windows-shell-context-menu-option ] -->
			<TargetObject condition="contains">Classes\Drive\</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Explorer: [ https://stackoverflow.com/questions/1323663/windows-shell-context-menu-option ] -->
			<TargetObject condition="contains">Classes\Folder\</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Explorer: ContextMenuHandlers, DragDropHandlers, CopyHookHandlers, [ https://stackoverflow.com/questions/1323663/windows-shell-context-menu-option ] -->
			<TargetObject condition="contains">Classes\PROTOCOLS\</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Explorer: Protocol handlers-->
			<TargetObject condition="contains">ContextMenuHandlers\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: [ http://oalabs.openanalysis.net/2015/06/04/malware-persistence-hkey_current_user-shell-extension-handlers/ ] -->
			<TargetObject condition="contains">CurrentVersion\Shell</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Shell Folders, ShellExecuteHooks, ShellIconOverloadIdentifers, ShellServiceObjects, ShellServiceObjectDelayLoad [ http://oalabs.openanalysis.net/2015/06/04/malware-persistence-hkey_current_user-shell-extension-handlers/ ] -->
			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\explorer\ShellExecuteHooks</TargetObject> <!--Windows: ShellExecuteHooks-->
			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\explorer\ShellServiceObjectDelayLoad</TargetObject> <!--Windows: ShellExecuteHooks-->
			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\explorer\ShellIconOverlayIdentifiers</TargetObject> <!--Windows: ShellExecuteHooks-->
			<!--AppPaths hijacking-->
			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Credit to @Hexacorn [ http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2013/01/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-3/ ] -->
			<!--Terminal service boobytrap-->
			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp\InitialProgram</TargetObject> <!--Windows:RDP: Note other Terminal Server run keys are handled by another wildcard already-->
			<!--Group Policy integrity-->
			<TargetObject name="T1484" condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\GPExtensions\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Group Policy internally uses a plug-in architecture that nothing should be modifying-->
			<!--Winsock and Winsock2-->
			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\WinSock</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Wildcard, includes Winsock and Winsock2-->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">\ProxyServer</TargetObject> <!--Windows: System and user proxy server-->
			<!--Credential providers-->
			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Authentication\Credential Provider</TargetObject> <!--Wildcard, includes Credential Providers and Credential Provider Filters-->
			<TargetObject name="T1101" condition="begin with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\</TargetObject> <!-- [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1131 ] [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1101 ] -->
			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\SecurityProviders</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Changes to WDigest-UseLogonCredential for password scraping [ https://www.trustedsec.com/april-2015/dumping-wdigest-creds-with-meterpreter-mimikatzkiwi-in-windows-8-1/ ] -->
			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Netsh</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Netsh helper DLL [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1128 ] -->
			<!--Networking-->
			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\NetworkProvider\Order\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Order of network providers that are checked to connect to destination [ https://www.malwarearchaeology.com/cheat-sheets ] -->
			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\NetworkList\Profiles</TargetObject> <!--Windows: | Credit @ion-storm -->
			<TargetObject name="T1089" condition="end with">\EnableFirewall</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Monitor for firewall disablement, all firewall profiles [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089 ] -->
			<TargetObject name="T1089" condition="end with">\DoNotAllowExceptions</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Monitor for firewall disablement, all firewall profiles [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089 ] -->
			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\StandardProfile\AuthorizedApplications\List</TargetObject> <!--Windows Firewall authorized applications for all networks| Credit @ion-storm -->
			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\DomainProfile\AuthorizedApplications\List</TargetObject> <!--Windows Firewall authorized applications for domain networks -->
			<!--DLLs that get injected into every process at launch-->
			<TargetObject name="T1103" condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Appinit_Dlls\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Feature disabled by default [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1103 ] -->
			<TargetObject name="T1103" condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Appinit_Dlls\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Feature disabled by default [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1103 ] -->
			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\AppCertDlls\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Credit to @Hexacorn [ http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2013/01/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-3/ ] [ https://blog.comodo.com/malware/trojware-win32-trojanspy-volisk-a/ ] -->
			<!--Office-->
			<TargetObject name="T1137" condition="contains">Microsoft\Office\Outlook\Addins\</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Office: Outlook add-ins, access to sensitive data and often cause issues-->
			<TargetObject name="T1137" condition="contains">Office Test\</TargetObject> <!-- Microsoft:Office: Persistence method [ http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/04/16/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-10/ ] | Credit @Hexacorn -->
			<TargetObject name="Context,ProtectedModeExitOrMacrosUsed" condition="contains">Security\Trusted Documents\TrustRecords</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Office: Monitor when "Enable editing" or "Enable macros" is used | Credit @OutflankNL | [ https://outflank.nl/blog/2018/01/16/hunting-for-evil-detect-macros-being-executed/ ] -->
			<!--IE-->
			<TargetObject name="T1176" condition="contains">Internet Explorer\Toolbar\</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:InternetExplorer: Machine and user [ Example: https://www.exterminate-it.com/malpedia/remove-mywebsearch ] -->
			<TargetObject name="T1176" condition="contains">Internet Explorer\Extensions\</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:InternetExplorer: Machine and user [ Example: https://www.exterminate-it.com/malpedia/remove-mywebsearch ] -->
			<TargetObject name="T1176" condition="contains">Browser Helper Objects\</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:InternetExplorer: Machine and user [ https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb250436(v=vs.85).aspx ] -->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">\DisableSecuritySettingsCheck</TargetObject>
			<TargetObject condition="end with">\3\1206</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:InternetExplorer: Malware sometimes assures scripting is on in Internet Zone [ https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/182569/internet-explorer-security-zones-registry-entries-for-advanced-users ] -->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">\3\2500</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:InternetExplorer: Malware sometimes disables Protected Mode in Internet Zone [ https://blog.avast.com/2013/08/12/your-documents-are-corrupted-from-image-to-an-information-stealing-trojan/ ] -->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">\3\1809</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:InternetExplorer: Malware sometimes disables Pop-up Blocker in Internet Zone [ https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/182569/internet-explorer-security-zones-registry-entries-for-advanced-users ] -->
			<!--Magic registry keys-->
			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Classes\CLSID\{AB8902B4-09CA-4BB6-B78D-A8F59079A8D5}\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Thumbnail cache autostart [ http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/poweliks-levels-up-with-new-autostart-mechanism/ ] -->
			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Classes\WOW6432Node\CLSID\{AB8902B4-09CA-4BB6-B78D-A8F59079A8D5}\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Thumbnail cache autostart [ http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/poweliks-levels-up-with-new-autostart-mechanism/ ] -->
			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Classes\CLSID\{083863F1-70DE-11d0-BD40-00A0C911CE86}\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: DirectX instances-->
			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Classes\WOW6432Node\CLSID\{083863F1-70DE-11d0-BD40-00A0C911CE86}\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: DirectX instances-->
			<!--Install/Run artifacts-->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">\UrlUpdateInfo</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:ClickOnce: Source URL is stored in this value [ https://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2016/12/mimikatz-delivery-via-clickonce-with.html ] -->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">\InstallSource</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Source folder for certain program and component installations-->
			<TargetObject name="Alert,Sysinternals Tool Used" condition="end with">\EulaAccepted</TargetObject> <!--Sysinternals tool launched. Lots of useful abilities for attackers -->
			<!--Antivirus tampering-->
			<TargetObject name="T1089,Tamper-Defender" condition="end with">\DisableAntiSpyware</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Defender: State modified via registry-->
			<TargetObject name="T1089,Tamper-Defender" condition="end with">\DisableAntiVirus</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Defender: State modified via registry-->
			<TargetObject name="T1089,Tamper-Defender" condition="end with">\SpynetReporting</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Defender: State modified via registry-->
			<TargetObject name="T1089,Tamper-Defender" condition="end with">DisableRealtimeMonitoring</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Defender: State modified via registry-->
			<TargetObject name="T1089,Tamper-Defender" condition="end with">\SubmitSamplesConsent</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Defender: State modified via registry-->
			<!--Windows UAC tampering-->
			<TargetObject name="T1088" condition="end with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA</TargetObject> <!--Detect: UAC Tampering | Credit @ion-storm -->
			<TargetObject name="T1088" condition="end with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy</TargetObject> <!--Detect: UAC Tampering | Credit @ion-storm -->
			<!--Microsoft Security Center tampering | Credit @ion-storm -->
			<TargetObject name="T1089,Tamper-SecCenter" condition="end with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Security Center\</TargetObject> <!-- [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089 ] -->
			<TargetObject name="T1089,Tamper-SecCenter" condition="end with">SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\HideSCAHealth</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Security Center: Malware sometimes disables [ https://blog.avast.com/2013/08/12/your-documents-are-corrupted-from-image-to-an-information-stealing-trojan/ ] -->
			<!--Windows application compatibility-->
			<TargetObject name="T1138,AppCompatShim" condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Custom</TargetObject> <!--Windows: AppCompat [ https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html ] -->
			<TargetObject name="T1138,AppCompatShim" condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\InstalledSDB</TargetObject> <!--Windows: AppCompat [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1138 ] -->
			<TargetObject condition="contains">VirtualStore</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Registry virtualization, something's wrong if it's in use [ https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa965884(v=vs.85).aspx ] -->
			<!--Windows internals integrity monitoring-->
			<TargetObject name="T1183,IFEO" condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Malware likes changing IFEO, like adding Debugger to disable antivirus EXE-->
			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Event log system integrity and ACLs-->
			<TargetObject name="Tamper-Safemode" condition="begin with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Safeboot\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Services approved to load in safe mode. Almost nothing should ever modify this.-->
			<TargetObject name="Tamper-Winlogon" condition="begin with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Winlogon\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Providers notified by WinLogon-->
			<TargetObject name="Context,DeviceConntectedOrUpdated" condition="end with">\FriendlyName</TargetObject> <!--Windows: New devices connected and remembered-->
			<TargetObject name="Context,MsiInstallerStarted" condition="is">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Installer\InProgress\(Default)</TargetObject> <!--Windows: See when WindowsInstaller is engaged, useful for timeline matching with other events-->
			<TargetObject name="Tamper-Tracing" condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Tracing\RASAPI32</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Malware sometimes disables tracing to obfuscate tracks-->
			<!--Windows inventory events-->
			<TargetObject name="InvDB-Path" condition="end with">\LowerCaseLongPath</TargetObject> <!-- [ https://binaryforay.blogspot.com/2017/10/amcache-still-rules-everything-around.html ] -->
			<TargetObject name="InvDB-Pub" condition="end with">\Publisher</TargetObject> <!-- [ https://binaryforay.blogspot.com/2017/10/amcache-still-rules-everything-around.html ] -->
			<TargetObject name="InvDB-Ver" condition="end with">\BinProductVersion</TargetObject> <!-- [ https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/privacy/basic-level-windows-diagnostic-events-and-fields-1709 ] -->
			<TargetObject name="InvDB-DriverVer" condition="end with">\DriverVersion</TargetObject> <!-- [ https://df-stream.com/2015/02/leveraging-devicecontainers-key/ ] -->
			<TargetObject name="InvDB-DriverVer" condition="end with">\DriverVerVersion</TargetObject> <!-- [ https://df-stream.com/2015/02/leveraging-devicecontainers-key/ ] -->
			<TargetObject name="InvDB-CompileTimeClaim" condition="end with">\LinkDate</TargetObject> <!-- Compile time of EXE, may not be reliable [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Link_time ] -->
			<TargetObject name="InvDB" condition="contains">Compatibility Assistant\Store\</TargetObject> <!-- Inventory -->
			<!--Suspicious sources-->
			<Image name="Suspicious,ImageBeginWithBackslash" condition="begin with">\</Image> <!--Devices and VSC shouldn't be executing changes | Credit: @SBousseaden @ionstorm @neu5ron @PerchedSystems [ https://twitter.com/SwiftOnSecurity/status/1133167323991486464 ] -->
		</RegistryEvent>
	</RuleGroup>

	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
		<RegistryEvent onmatch="exclude">
		<!--COMMENT:	Remove low-information noise. Often these hide a procress recreating an empty key and do not hide the values created subsequently.-->
		<!--NOTE:	A lot of noise can be removed by excluding CreateKey events, which are largely innocuous-->
			<TargetObject condition="contains">\{CAFEEFAC-</TargetObject>
			<EventType condition="is">CreateKey</EventType>
			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\COMPONENTS</TargetObject>
			<!--Inventory noise-->
			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\AppModel\StateRepository\Cache</TargetObject>
			<!--Misc-->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">Toolbar\WebBrowser</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:IE: Extraneous activity-->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">Browser\ITBar7Height</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:IE: Extraneous activity, covers ShellBrowser and WebBrowser-->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">Browser\ITBar7Layout</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:IE: Extraneous activity-->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">Internet Explorer\Toolbar\Locked</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Explorer: Extraneous activity-->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">Toolbar\WebBrowser\{47833539-D0C5-4125-9FA8-0819E2EAAC93}</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Explorer: Extraneous activity-->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">}\PreviousPolicyAreas</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise from \Winlogon\GPExtensions by svchost.exe-->
			<TargetObject condition="contains">\Control\WMI\Autologger\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise from monitoring "\Start"-->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\UsoSvc\Start</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise from monitoring "\Start"-->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">\Lsa\OfflineJoin\CurrentValue</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Sensitive value during domain join-->
			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Installer\UserData\S-1-5-18\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise monitoring installations run as system-->
			<TargetObject condition="contains">_Classes\AppX</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise monitoring "Shell\open\command"--> <!--Win8+-->
			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Publishers\</TargetObject> <!--Windows: SvcHost Noise-->
			<!--Bootup Control noise-->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\LsaPid</TargetObject> <!--Windows:lsass.exe: Boot noise-->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\SspiCache</TargetObject> <!--Windows:lsass.exe: Boot noise--> <!--Win8+-->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Kerberos\Domains</TargetObject> <!--Windows:lsass.exe: Boot noise--> <!--Win8+-->
			<!--Services startup settings noise, some low-risk services routinely change it and this can be ignored-->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">\Services\BITS\Start</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise from monitoring "\Start"-->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">\services\clr_optimization_v2.0.50727_32\Start</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:dotNet: Windows 7-->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">\services\clr_optimization_v2.0.50727_64\Start</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:dotNet: Windows 7-->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">\services\clr_optimization_v4.0.30319_32\Start</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:dotNet: Windows 10-->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">\services\clr_optimization_v4.0.30319_64\Start</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:dotNet: Windows 10-->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">\services\deviceAssociationService\Start</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise from monitoring "\Start"-->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">\services\fhsvc\Start</TargetObject> <!--Windows: File History Service-->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">\services\nal\Start</TargetObject> <!--Intel: Network adapter diagnostic driver-->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">\services\trustedInstaller\Start</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise from monitoring "\Start"-->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">\services\tunnel\Start</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise from monitoring "\Start"-->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">\services\usoSvc\Start</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise from monitoring "\Start"-->
			<!--FileExts noise filtering-->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">\UserChoice\ProgId</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise from monitoring "FileExts"--> <!--Win8+-->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">\UserChoice\Hash</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise from monitoring "FileExts"--> <!--Win8+-->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">\OpenWithList\MRUList</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise from monitoring "FileExts"-->
			<TargetObject condition="contains">Shell Extentions\Cached</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Remove noise generated by explorer.exe on monitored ShellCached binary keys--> <!--Win8+-->
			<!--Group Policy noise-->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Audit\SpecialGroups</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Routinely set through Group Policy, not especially important to log-->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Group Policy\Scripts\Startup\0\PSScriptOrder</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Group Policy: Noise below the actual key while building-->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Group Policy\Scripts\Startup\0\SOM-ID</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Group Policy: Noise below the actual key while building-->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Group Policy\Scripts\Startup\0\GPO-ID</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Group Policy: Noise below the actual key while building-->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Group Policy\Scripts\Startup\0\0\IsPowershell</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Group Policy: Noise below the actual key while building-->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Group Policy\Scripts\Startup\0\0\ExecTime</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Group Policy: Noise below the actual key while building-->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Group Policy\Scripts\Shutdown\0\PSScriptOrder</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Group Policy: Noise below the actual key while building-->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Group Policy\Scripts\Shutdown\0\SOM-ID</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Group Policy: Noise below the actual key while building-->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Group Policy\Scripts\Shutdown\0\GPO-ID</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Group Policy: Noise below the actual key while building-->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Group Policy\Scripts\Shutdown\0\0\IsPowershell</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Group Policy: Noise below the actual key while building-->
			<TargetObject condition="end with">SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Group Policy\Scripts\Shutdown\0\0\ExecTime</TargetObject> <!--Windows:Group Policy: Noise below the actual key while building-->
			<TargetObject condition="contains">\safer\codeidentifiers\0\HASHES\{</TargetObject> <!--Windows: Software Restriction Policies. Can be used to disable security tools, but very noisy to monitor if you use it-->
			<!--SECTION: Office C2R-->
			<TargetObject condition="contains">VirtualStore\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\ClickToRun\</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft: SearchProtocolHost writes to OfficeC2R registry for Outlook, seemingly regarding mail indexing-->
			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\ClickToRun\</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft: Virtual registry for Office-->
			<!--SECTION: 3rd party-->
			<Image condition="is">C:\Program Files\WIDCOMM\Bluetooth Software\btwdins.exe</Image> <!--Constantly writes to HKLM-->
			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKCR\VLC.</TargetObject> <!--VLC update noise-->
			<TargetObject condition="begin with">HKCR\iTunes.</TargetObject> <!--Apple: iTunes update noise-->
			<!--WINEVT publishers noise-->
			<TargetObject condition="is">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Publishers\{945a8954-c147-4acd-923f-40c45405a658}</TargetObject> <!--Windows update-->
		</RegistryEvent>
	</RuleGroup>

	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 15 : ALTERNATE DATA STREAM CREATED [FileCreateStreamHash]-->
		<!--EVENT 15: "File stream created"-->
		<!--COMMENT:	Any files created with an NTFS Alternate Data Stream which match these rules will be hashed and logged.
			[ https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2013/03/24/alternate-data-streams-in-ntfs/ ]
			ADS's are used by browsers and email clients to mark files as originating from the Internet or other foreign sources.
			[ https://textslashplain.com/2016/04/04/downloads-and-the-mark-of-the-web/ ] -->
		<!--NOTE: Other filesystem minifilters can make it appear to Sysmon that some files are being written twice. This is not a Sysmon issue, per Mark Russinovich.-->

		<!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image, TargetFilename, CreationUtcTime, Hash-->
		<FileCreateStreamHash onmatch="include">
			<TargetFilename condition="contains">Downloads</TargetFilename> <!--Downloaded files. Does not include "Run" files in IE-->
			<TargetFilename condition="contains">Temp\7z</TargetFilename> <!--7zip extractions-->
			<TargetFilename condition="contains">Startup</TargetFilename> <!--ADS startup | Example: [ https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/a314f6106633fba4b70f9d6ddbee452e8f8f44a72117749c21243dc93c7ed3ac?environmentId=100 ] -->
			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.bat</TargetFilename> <!--Batch scripting-->
			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.cmd</TargetFilename> <!--Batch scripting | Credit @ion-storm -->
			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.doc</TargetFilename> <!--Office doc potentially with macro -->
			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.hta</TargetFilename> <!--Scripting-->
			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.lnk</TargetFilename> <!--Shortcut file | Credit @ion-storm -->
			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.ppt</TargetFilename> <!--Office doc potentially with macros-->
			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.ps1</TargetFilename> <!--PowerShell-->
			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.ps2</TargetFilename> <!--PowerShell-->
			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.reg</TargetFilename> <!--Registry File-->
			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.jse</TargetFilename> <!--Registry File-->
			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.vb</TargetFilename> <!--VisualBasicScripting files-->
			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.vbe</TargetFilename> <!--VisualBasicScripting files-->
			<TargetFilename condition="end with">.vbs</TargetFilename> <!--VisualBasicScripting files-->
		</FileCreateStreamHash>

	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
		<FileCreateStreamHash onmatch="exclude">
		</FileCreateStreamHash>
	</RuleGroup>

	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 16 : SYSMON CONFIGURATION CHANGE-->
		<!--EVENT 16: "Sysmon config state changed"-->
		<!--COMMENT:	This ONLY logs if the hash of the configuration changes. Running "sysmon.exe -c" with the current configuration will not be logged with Event 16-->
		
		<!--DATA: UtcTime, Configuration, ConfigurationFileHash-->
		<!--Cannot be filtered.-->

	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 17 & 18 : PIPE CREATED / PIPE CONNECTED [PipeEvent]-->
		<!--EVENT 17: "Pipe Created"-->
		<!--EVENT 18: "Pipe Connected"-->

		<!--ADDITIONAL REFERENCE: [ https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-smb-beacon ] -->
		<!--ADDITIONAL REFERENCE: [ https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2015/10/07/named-pipe-pivoting/ ] -->

		<!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, PipeName, Image-->
	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
		<PipeEvent onmatch="include">
			<!--NOTE: Using incide with no rules means nothing in this section will be logged-->
		</PipeEvent>
	</RuleGroup>

	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 19 & 20 & 21 : WMI EVENT MONITORING [WmiEvent]-->
		<!--EVENT 19: "WmiEventFilter activity detected"-->
		<!--EVENT 20: "WmiEventConsumer activity detected"-->
		<!--EVENT 21: "WmiEventConsumerToFilter activity detected"-->

		<!--ADDITIONAL REFERENCE: [ https://www.darkoperator.com/blog/2017/10/15/sysinternals-sysmon-610-tracking-of-permanent-wmi-events ] -->
		<!--ADDITIONAL REFERENCE: [ https://rawsec.lu/blog/posts/2017/Sep/19/sysmon-v610-vs-wmi-persistence/ ] -->

		<!--DATA: EventType, UtcTime, Operation, User, Name, Type, Destination, Consumer, Filter-->
	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
		<WmiEvent onmatch="exclude">
			<!--NOTE: Using exclude with no rules means everything will be logged-->
		</WmiEvent>
	</RuleGroup>

	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 22 : DNS QUERY [DnsQuery]-->
		<!--EVENT 22: "Dns query"-->

		<!--NOTE:	Due to the volume of events that DNS queries generate, some orgs may want to remove this section from their configuration to reduce Sysmon log turnover. -->

		<!--COMMENT:	DNS logging is a very nuanced challenge in monitoring due to event volume. Legitimate domains can be used to host malware/C2, but lookup itself is not very informative.
						It's fine to exclude monitoring these bulk low-value lookups, but at same time, you would not have a full log of how malware communicated, potentially missing C2.
						This section of Sysmon configuration will require your full judgement and knowledge of your org's priorities. There is no correct answer.-->

		<!--OPERATIONS:	Chrome and Firefox prefetch DNS lookups, or use alternate DNS lookup methods Sysmon won't capture. You need to turn these off.
						Search for Group Policy for these browsers to configure this.-->

		<!--OPERATIONS:	Most DNS traffic is web advertising. To significantly reduce DNS queries and malware ads, enable client-side advertising filtering via Group Policy. This is easy.
				Internet Explorer: https://decentsecurity.com/adblocking-for-internet-explorer-deployment/
				Chrome: https://decentsecurity.com/ublock-for-google-chrome-deployment/
				Firefox: ToDo
						Also note, this configuration is designed for United States computers. Your country's users will may need customization to reduce noise.
			-->

		<!--CONFIG:	DNS poisoning is an issue during threat investigations. Try to only exclude ROUTINE system-level queries you know are strongly validated with HTTPS or code signing.-->
		<!--CONFIG:	If you exclude microsoft.com, someone could register malware-microsoft.com and it wouldn't be logged. Use "END WITH" with leading . or "IS" operators.-->
		<!--CONFIG:	Be very specific in exclusions. Threat actors use legitimate services, too. Dont exclude all of AWS or Azure or Google or CDNs!-->
		<!--CONFIG: Popularity data: [ http://s3-us-west-1.amazonaws.com/umbrella-static/index.html ] [ https://better.fyi/trackers/alexa-top-500-news/ ] -->

		<!--CRITICAL:	Do NOT exclude "wpad" lookups. This is a MitM vector routinely used by attackers. Disable WPAD or enforce client-side DNSSEC for AD domain lookups.-->
		<!--CRITICAL:	Do NOT exclude IPv6 lookups.-->

		<!--DATA: RuleName, UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, QueryName, QueryType, QueryStatus, QueryResults (can't filter on)-->

		<!--BELOW: These domains should not be excluded at the top level. Be specific if you want to reduce noise under them.-->
		<!-- Rejected: .cloudapp.net, customer content [ https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/ptsblog/2012/06/18/security-consideration-when-using-cloudapp-net-domain-as-production-environment-in-windows-azure/ ] -->
		<!-- Rejected: .googleapis.com, customer content [ https://www.zdnet.com/article/this-business-email-scam-spreads-trojans-through-google-cloud-storage/ ] -->
		<!-- Rejected: .cloudfront.net, customer content -->
		<!-- Rejected: .windows.net, customer content -->
		<!-- Rejected: *github.com, customer content, including open-source malware components -->

	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
		<DnsQuery onmatch="exclude">
			<Image condition="begin with">c:\windows\systemapps\microsoft.windows.search</Image>
			<!--Network noise-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.arpa.</QueryName> <!--Design decision to not log reverse DNS lookups. You will need to decide.-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.arpa</QueryName> <!--Design decision to not log reverse DNS lookups. You will need to decide.-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.msftncsi.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft proxy detection | Microsoft default exclusion-->
			<QueryName condition="is">..localmachine</QueryName>
			<QueryName condition="is">localhost</QueryName>
			<!--Microsoft-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">-pushp.svc.ms</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: Doesn't appear to host customer content or subdomains-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.b-msedge.net</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: Doesn't appear to host customer content or subdomains-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.bing.com</QueryName> <!-- Microsoft | Microsoft default exclusion -->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.hotmail.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft | Microsoft default exclusion-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.live.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft | Microsoft default exclusion-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.live.net</QueryName> <!--Microsoft | Microsoft default exclusion-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.s-microsoft.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.microsoft.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft | Microsoft default exclusion-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.microsoftonline.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft | Microsoft default exclusion-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.microsoftstore.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft | Microsoft default exclusion-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.ms-acdc.office.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: Doesn't appear to host customer content or subdomains-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.msedge.net</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: Doesn't appear to host customer content or subdomains-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.msn.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft | Microsoft default exclusion-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.msocdn.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.skype.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft | Microsoft default exclusion-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.skype.net</QueryName> <!--Microsoft | Microsoft default exclusion-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.windows.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.windows.net.nsatc.net</QueryName> <!--Microsoft-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.windowsupdate.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.xboxlive.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft-->
			<QueryName condition="is">login.windows.net</QueryName> <!--Microsoft-->
			<Image condition="begin with">C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\</Image> <!--Microsoft: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-atp/network-protection -->
			<!--Microsoft:Office365/AzureAD-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.activedirectory.windowsazure.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: AzureAD-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.aria.microsoft.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: OneDrive/SharePoint-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.msauth.net</QueryName>
			<QueryName condition="end with">.msftauth.net</QueryName>
			<QueryName condition="end with">.opinsights.azure.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: AzureAD/InTune client event monitoring-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">osi.office.net</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: Office-->
			<QueryName condition="is">loki.delve.office.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: Office-->
			<QueryName condition="is">management.azure.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: AzureAD/InTune-->
			<QueryName condition="is">messaging.office.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: Office-->
			<QueryName condition="is">outlook.office365.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: Protected by HSTS-->
			<QueryName condition="is">portal.azure.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: AzureAD/InTune-->
			<QueryName condition="is">protection.outlook.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: Office-->
			<QueryName condition="is">substrate.office.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft: Office-->
			<!--3rd-party applications-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.mozaws.net</QueryName> <!--Mozilla-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.mozilla.com</QueryName> <!--Mozilla-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.mozilla.net</QueryName> <!--Mozilla-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.mozilla.org</QueryName> <!--Mozilla-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.spotify.com</QueryName> <!--Spotify-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.spotify.map.fastly.net</QueryName> <!--Spotify-->
			<QueryName condition="is">clients1.google.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
			<QueryName condition="is">clients2.google.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
			<QueryName condition="is">clients3.google.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
			<QueryName condition="is">clients4.google.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
			<QueryName condition="is">clients5.google.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
			<QueryName condition="is">clients6.google.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
			<QueryName condition="is">safebrowsing.googleapis.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
			<!--Goodlist CDN-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.akadns.net</QueryName> <!--AkamaiCDN, extensively used by Microsoft | Microsoft default exclusion-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.netflix.com</QueryName>
			<QueryName condition="end with">aspnetcdn.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft [ https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/aspnet/ajax/cdn/overview ]-->
			<QueryName condition="is">ajax.googleapis.com</QueryName>
			<QueryName condition="is">cdnjs.cloudflare.com</QueryName> <!--Cloudflare: Hosts popular javascript libraries-->
			<QueryName condition="is">fonts.googleapis.com</QueryName> <!--Google fonts-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.typekit.net</QueryName> <!--Adobe fonts-->
			<QueryName condition="is">cdnjs.cloudflare.com</QueryName>
			<QueryName condition="end with">.stackassets.com</QueryName> <!--Stack Overflow-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.steamcontent.com</QueryName>
			<!--Web resources-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.disqus.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft default exclusion-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.fontawesome.com</QueryName>
			<QueryName condition="is">disqus.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft default exclusion-->
			<!--Ads-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.1rx.io</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.2mdn.net</QueryName> <!--Ads: Google | Microsoft default exclusion-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.adadvisor.net</QueryName> <!--Ads: Neustar [ https://better.fyi/trackers/adadvisor.net/ ] -->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.adap.tv</QueryName> <!--Ads:AOL | Microsoft default exclusion [ https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/adap-tv ] -->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.addthis.com</QueryName> <!--Ads:Oracle | Microsoft default exclusion [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AddThis ] -->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.adform.net</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.adnxs.com</QueryName> <!--Ads: AppNexus | Microsoft default exclusion-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.adroll.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.adrta.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.adsafeprotected.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.adsrvr.org</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.advertising.com</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.amazon-adsystem.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.amazon-adsystem.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.analytics.yahoo.com</QueryName> <!--Ads:Yahoo-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.aol.com</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion -->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.betrad.com</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.bidswitch.net</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.casalemedia.com</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.chartbeat.net</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion [ https://better.fyi/trackers/chartbeat.com/ ]-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.cnn.com</QueryName> <!-- Microsoft default exclusion-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.convertro.com</QueryName> <!--Ads:Verizon-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.criteo.com</QueryName> <!--Ads [ https://better.fyi/trackers/criteo.com/ ] -->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.criteo.net</QueryName> <!--Ads [ https://better.fyi/trackers/criteo.com/ ] -->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.crwdcntrl.net</QueryName> <!--Ads: Lotame [ https://better.fyi/trackers/crwdcntrl.net/ ] -->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.demdex.net</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.domdex.com</QueryName> 
			<QueryName condition="end with">.dotomi.com</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.doubleclick.net</QueryName> <!--Ads:Conversant | Microsoft default exclusion [ https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/dotomi ] -->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.doubleverify.com</QueryName> <!--Ads: Google-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.emxdgt.com</QueryName> <!--Ads: EMX-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.exelator.com</QueryName> <!--Ads:Nielson Marketing Cloud-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.google-analytics.com</QueryName> <!--Ads:Google | Microsoft default exclusion-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.googleadservices.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.googlesyndication.com</QueryName> <!--Ads:Google, sometimes called during malicious ads, but not directly responsible | Microsoft default exclusion [ https://www.hackread.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Bitdefender-Whitepaper-Zacinlo.pdf ]-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.googletagmanager.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.googlevideo.com</QueryName> <!--Google | Microsoft default exclusion-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.gstatic.com</QueryName> <!--Google | Microsoft default exclusion-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.gvt1.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.gvt2.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.ib-ibi.com</QueryName> <!--Ads: Offerpath [ https://better.fyi/trackers/ib-ibi.com/ ] -->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.jivox.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.mathtag.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft default exclusion-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.moatads.com</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.moatpixel.com</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.mookie1.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.myvisualiq.net</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.netmng.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.nexac.com</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.openx.net</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.optimizely.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.outbrain.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.pardot.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.phx.gbl</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.pinterest.com</QueryName> <!--Pinerest-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.pubmatic.com</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.quantcount.com</QueryName>
			<QueryName condition="end with">.quantserve.com</QueryName>
			<QueryName condition="end with">.revsci.net</QueryName> <!--Ads:Omniture | Microsoft default exclusion-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.rfihub.net</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.rlcdn.com</QueryName> <!--Ads: Rapleaf [ https://better.fyi/trackers/rlcdn.com/ ] -->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.rubiconproject.com</QueryName> <!--Ads: Rubicon Project | Microsoft default exclusion [ https://better.fyi/trackers/rubiconproject.com/ ] -->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.scdn.co</QueryName> <!--Spotify-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.scorecardresearch.com</QueryName> <!--Ads: Comscore | Microsoft default exclusion-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.serving-sys.com</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.sharethrough.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.simpli.fi</QueryName>
			<QueryName condition="end with">.sitescout.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.smartadserver.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.snapads.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.spotxchange.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.taboola.com</QueryName> <!--Ads:Taboola-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.taboola.map.fastly.net</QueryName> <!--Ads:Taboola-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.tapad.com</QueryName>
			<QueryName condition="end with">.tidaltv.com</QueryName> <!--Ads: Videology [ https://better.fyi/trackers/tidaltv.com/ ] -->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.trafficmanager.net</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.tremorhub.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.tribalfusion.com</QueryName> <!--Ads: Exponential [ https://better.fyi/trackers/tribalfusion.com/ ] -->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.turn.com</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion [ https://better.fyi/trackers/turn.com/ ] -->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.twimg.com</QueryName> <!--Ads | Microsoft default exclusion-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.tynt.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.w55c.net</QueryName> <!--Ads:dataxu-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.ytimg.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.zorosrv.com</QueryName> <!--Ads:Taboola-->
			<QueryName condition="is">1rx.io</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
			<QueryName condition="is">adservice.google.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
			<QueryName condition="is">ampcid.google.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
			<QueryName condition="is">clientservices.googleapis.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
			<QueryName condition="is">googleadapis.l.google.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
			<QueryName condition="is">imasdk.googleapis.com</QueryName> <!--Google [ https://developers.google.com/interactive-media-ads/docs/sdks/html5/ ] -->
			<QueryName condition="is">l.google.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
			<QueryName condition="is">ml314.com</QueryName> <!--Ads-->
			<QueryName condition="is">mtalk.google.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
			<QueryName condition="is">update.googleapis.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
			<QueryName condition="is">www.googletagservices.com</QueryName> <!--Google-->
			<!--SocialNet-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.pscp.tv</QueryName> <!--Twitter:Periscope-->
			<!--OSCP/CRL Common-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">.digicert.com</QueryName>
			<QueryName condition="end with">.globalsign.com</QueryName>
			<QueryName condition="end with">.globalsign.net</QueryName>
			<QueryName condition="is">msocsp.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft:OCSP-->
			<QueryName condition="is">ocsp.msocsp.com</QueryName> <!--Microsoft:OCSP-->
			<QueryName condition="end with">pki.goog</QueryName>
			<QueryName condition="is">ocsp.godaddy.com</QueryName>
			<QueryName condition="end with">amazontrust.com</QueryName>
			<QueryName condition="is">ocsp.sectigo.com</QueryName>
			<QueryName condition="is">pki-goog.l.google.com</QueryName>
			<QueryName condition="end with">.usertrust.com</QueryName>
			<QueryName condition="is">ocsp.comodoca.com</QueryName>
			<QueryName condition="is">ocsp.verisign.com</QueryName>
			<QueryName condition="is">ocsp.entrust.net</QueryName>
			<QueryName condition="end with">ocsp.identrust.com</QueryName>
			<QueryName condition="is">status.rapidssl.com</QueryName>
			<QueryName condition="is">status.thawte.com</QueryName>
			<QueryName condition="is">ocsp.int-x3.letsencrypt.org</QueryName>
		</DnsQuery>
	</RuleGroup>
<!--include all to test-->
	<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
      		<ProcessTampering onmatch="exclude">
			    <Image condition="image">unknown process</Image>
				<Image condition="is">C:\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe</Image>
				<Image condition="is">C:\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\updater.exe</Image>
				<Image condition="is">C:\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\default-browser-agent.exe</Image>
				<Image condition="is">C:\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\pingsender.exe</Image>
      		</ProcessTampering>
    	</RuleGroup>

	<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 255 : ERROR-->
		<!--"This event is generated when an error occurred within Sysmon. They can happen if the system is under heavy load
			and certain tasked could not be performed or a bug exists in the Sysmon service. You can report any bugs on the
			Sysinternals forum or over Twitter (@markrussinovich)."-->
		<!--Cannot be filtered.-->

	</EventFiltering>
</Sysmon>