Merge branch 'develop' into nterl0k-t1114.003-o365-transport-rule-change

Author: patel-bhavin

contentctl.yml

@@ -71,9 +71,9 @@ apps:
 - uid: 833
   title: Splunk Add-on for Unix and Linux
   appid: Splunk_TA_nix
-  version: 9.2.0
+  version: 10.0.0
   description: description of app
-  hardcoded_path: https://attack-range-appbinaries.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/splunk-add-on-for-unix-and-linux_920.tgz
+  hardcoded_path: https://attack-range-appbinaries.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/splunk-add-on-for-unix-and-linux_1000.tgz
 - uid: 5579
   title: Splunk Add-on for CrowdStrike FDR
   appid: Splunk_TA_CrowdStrike_FDR

data_sources/linux_auditd_add_user.yml

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ configuration: https://github.com/Neo23x0/auditd/blob/master/audit.rules
 supported_TA:
 - name: Splunk Add-on for Unix and Linux
   url: https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/833
-  version: 9.2.0
+  version: 10.0.0
 fields:
 - msg
 - type
@@ -30,4 +30,6 @@ fields:
 - UID
 - AUID
 - ID
-example_log: 'type=ADD_USER msg=audit(1722950859.266:6994): pid=1788 uid=0 auid=1000 ses=1 subj=unconfined msg=''op=adding user id=1002 exe="/usr/sbin/useradd" hostname=ar-linux1 addr=? terminal=pts/1 res=success''UID="root" AUID="ubuntu" ID="unknown(1002)"'
+example_log: 'type=ADD_USER msg=audit(1722950859.266:6994): pid=1788 uid=0 auid=1000
+  ses=1 subj=unconfined msg=''op=adding user id=1002 exe="/usr/sbin/useradd" hostname=ar-linux1
+  addr=? terminal=pts/1 res=success''UID="root" AUID="ubuntu" ID="unknown(1002)"'

data_sources/linux_auditd_execve.yml

@@ -10,10 +10,11 @@ configuration: https://github.com/Neo23x0/auditd/blob/master/audit.rules
 supported_TA:
 - name: Splunk Add-on for Unix and Linux
   url: https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/833
-  version: 9.2.0
+  version: 10.0.0
 fields:
 - msg
 - type
 - msg
 - argc
-example_log: 'type=EXECVE msg=audit(1723044684.257:15795): argc=3 a0="sudo" a1="LD_PRELOAD=./myfopen.so" a2="./prog"'
+example_log: 'type=EXECVE msg=audit(1723044684.257:15795): argc=3 a0="sudo" a1="LD_PRELOAD=./myfopen.so"
+  a2="./prog"'

data_sources/linux_auditd_path.yml

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ configuration: https://github.com/Neo23x0/auditd/blob/master/audit.rules
 supported_TA:
 - name: Splunk Add-on for Unix and Linux
   url: https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/833
-  version: 9.2.0
+  version: 10.0.0
 fields:
 - msg
 - type
@@ -30,4 +30,6 @@ fields:
 - cap_frootid
 - OUID
 - OGID
-example_log: 'type=PATH msg=audit(1723043687.149:14898): item=1 name="/etc/ssh/ssh_config~" inode=1292 dev=103:01 mode=0100644 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 nametype=DELETE cap_fp=0 cap_fi=0 cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_frootid=0 OUID="root" OGID="root"'
+example_log: 'type=PATH msg=audit(1723043687.149:14898): item=1 name="/etc/ssh/ssh_config~"
+  inode=1292 dev=103:01 mode=0100644 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 nametype=DELETE cap_fp=0
+  cap_fi=0 cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_frootid=0 OUID="root" OGID="root"'

data_sources/linux_auditd_proctitle.yml

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ configuration: https://github.com/Neo23x0/auditd/blob/master/audit.rules
 supported_TA:
 - name: Splunk Add-on for Unix and Linux
   url: https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/833
-  version: 9.2.0
+  version: 10.0.0
 fields:
 - proctitle
 - msg

data_sources/linux_auditd_service_stop.yml

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ configuration: https://github.com/Neo23x0/auditd/blob/master/audit.rules
 supported_TA:
 - name: Splunk Add-on for Unix and Linux
   url: https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/833
-  version: 9.2.0
+  version: 10.0.0
 fields:
 - msg
 - type
@@ -28,4 +28,6 @@ fields:
 - res
 - UID
 - AUID
-example_log: 'type=SERVICE_STOP msg=audit(1722957155.494:4802): pid=1 uid=0 auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 subj=unconfined msg=''unit=atd comm="systemd" exe="/usr/lib/systemd/systemd" hostname=? addr=? terminal=? res=success''UID="root" AUID="unset"'
+example_log: 'type=SERVICE_STOP msg=audit(1722957155.494:4802): pid=1 uid=0 auid=4294967295
+  ses=4294967295 subj=unconfined msg=''unit=atd comm="systemd" exe="/usr/lib/systemd/systemd"
+  hostname=? addr=? terminal=? res=success''UID="root" AUID="unset"'

data_sources/linux_auditd_syscall.yml

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ configuration: https://github.com/Neo23x0/auditd/blob/master/audit.rules
 supported_TA:
 - name: Splunk Add-on for Unix and Linux
   url: https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/833
-  version: 9.2.0
+  version: 10.0.0
 fields:
 - msg
 - type
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ fields:
 - success
 - exit
 - a1
-- a2 
+- a2
 - a3
 - items
 - ppid
@@ -51,4 +51,9 @@ fields:
 - EGID
 - SGID
 - FSGID
-example_log: 'type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1723035666.627:3663): arch=c000003e syscall=59 success=yes exit=0 a0=556a6d697a58 a1=556a6d68ad00 a2=556a6d69c980 a3=0 items=2 ppid=1300 pid=1301 auid=1000 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts1 ses=1 comm="lsmod" exe="/usr/bin/kmod" subj=unconfined key="rootcmd" ARCH=x86_64 SYSCALL=execve AUID="ubuntu" UID="root" GID="root" EUID="root" SUID="root" FSUID="root" EGID="root" SGID="root" FSGID="root"'
+example_log: 'type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1723035666.627:3663): arch=c000003e syscall=59
+  success=yes exit=0 a0=556a6d697a58 a1=556a6d68ad00 a2=556a6d69c980 a3=0 items=2
+  ppid=1300 pid=1301 auid=1000 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0
+  tty=pts1 ses=1 comm="lsmod" exe="/usr/bin/kmod" subj=unconfined key="rootcmd" ARCH=x86_64
+  SYSCALL=execve AUID="ubuntu" UID="root" GID="root" EUID="root" SUID="root" FSUID="root"
+  EGID="root" SGID="root" FSGID="root"'

detections/cloud/o365_multiple_os_vendors_authenticating_from_user.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+name: O365 Multiple OS Vendors Authenticating From User
+id: 3451e58a-9457-4985-a600-b616b0cbfda1
+version: 1
+date: '2024-12-19'
+author: Steven Dick
+status: production
+type: TTP
+description: The following analytic identifies when multiple operating systems are used to authenticate to Azure/EntraID/Office 365 by the same user account over a short period of time. This activity could be indicative of attackers enumerating various logon capabilities of Azure/EntraID/Office 365 and attempting to discover weaknesses in the organizational MFA or conditional access configurations. Usage of the tools like "MFASweep" will trigger this detection.
+data_source: 
+- Office 365 Universal Audit Log
+search: |-
+  `o365_management_activity` Operation IN (UserLoginFailed,UserLoggedIn)
+  | eval -time = _time
+  | bin _time span=15m
+  | stats values(Operation) as signature, values(ErrorNumber) as signature_id, values(OS) as os_name, dc(OS) as os_count, count, min(-time) as firstTime, max(-time) as lastTime by  ClientIP, UserId, _time
+  | where os_count >= 4
+  | eval src = ClientIP, user = UserId
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `o365_multiple_os_vendors_authenticating_from_user_filter`
+how_to_implement: You must install the Splunk Microsoft Office 365 Add-on and ingest Office 365 management activity events. The thresholds set within the analytic (such as unique OS) are initial guidelines and should be customized based on the organization's user behavior and risk profile. Security teams are encouraged to adjust these thresholds to optimize the balance between detecting genuine threats and minimizing false positives, ensuring the detection is tailored to their specific environment.
+known_false_positives: IP or users where the usage of multiple Operating systems is expected, filter accordingly. 
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110
+- https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/exploiting-mfa-inconsistencies-on-microsoft-services/
+- https://sra.io/blog/msspray-wait-how-many-endpoints-dont-have-mfa/
+- https://github.com/dafthack/MFASweep/tree/master
+drilldown_searches:
+- name: View the detection results for - "$user$"
+  search: '%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$"'
+  earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
+  latest_offset: $info_max_time$
+- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$"
+  search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$") starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
+  earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
+  latest_offset: $info_max_time$
+- name: Investigate logons from $user$ 
+  search: '`o365_management_activity` Operation IN (UserLoginFailed,UserLoggedIn) "$user$"'
+  earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
+  latest_offset: $info_max_time$
+rba:
+  message: The user account $user$ authenticated with $os_count$ unique operating system types over a short period from $src$.
+  risk_objects:
+  - field: user
+    type: user
+    score: 60
+  threat_objects:
+  - field: src
+    type: ip_address
+tags:
+  analytic_story: 
+  - Office 365 Account Takeover
+  asset_type: O365 Tenant
+  mitre_attack_id: 
+  - T1110
+  product: 
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  security_domain: threat
+tests:
+- name: True Positive Test
+  attack_data:
+  - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110/azure_mfasweep_events/azure_mfasweep_events.log
+    source: o365
+    sourcetype: o365:management:activity

detections/endpoint/system_user_discovery_with_query.yml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 name: System User Discovery With Query
 id: ad03bfcf-8a91-4bc2-a500-112993deba87
-version: 4
-date: '2024-11-13'
+version: 5
+date: '2025-02-05'
 author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
 status: production
 type: Hunting
@@ -17,9 +17,8 @@ data_source:
 - Windows Event Log Security 4688
 - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="query.exe")
-  (Processes.process=*user*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process
-  Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="query.exe" OR Processes.original_file_name="query.exe")
+  AND Processes.process="*user*" AND ((NOT Processes.process="*/server*") OR Processes.process IN ("*/server:localhost*", "*/server:127.0.0.1*")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
   | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `system_user_discovery_with_query_filter`'
 how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection

detections/endpoint/windows_system_remote_discovery_with_query.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+name: Windows System Remote Discovery With Query
+id: 94859172-a521-474f-97ac-4cf4b09634a3
+version: 1
+date: '2025-02-05'
+author: Steven Dick
+status: production
+type: Anomaly
+description: The following analytic detects the execution of `query.exe` with command-line arguments aimed at discovering data on remote devices. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as adversaries may use `query.exe` to gain situational awareness and perform Active Directory discovery on compromised endpoints. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to identify various details about a system, aiding in further lateral movement and privilege escalation within the network.
+data_source: 
+- Sysmon Event ID 1
+- Windows Security Event ID 4688
+- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
+search: |-
+  | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process_current_directory) as Processes.process_current_directory values(Processes.process_id) as Processes.process_id values(Processes.process) as Processes.process values(Processes.parent_process_id) as Processes.parent_process_id values(Processes.parent_process) as Processes.parent_process count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="query.exe" OR Processes.original_file_name="query.exe") AND (Processes.process="*/server*") AND NOT Processes.process IN ("*/server:localhost*", "*/server:127.0.0.1*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name 
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
+  | `windows_system_remote_discovery_with_query_filter`
+how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
+known_false_positives: Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/
+drilldown_searches:
+- name: View the detection results for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
+  search: '%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$" user = "$user$"'
+  earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
+  latest_offset: $info_max_time$
+- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
+  search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$","$user$") starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
+  earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
+  latest_offset: $info_max_time$
+- name: Investigate processes on $dest$ 
+  search: '| from datamodel:Endpoint.Processes | search dest=$dest$ process_name = $process_name|s$'
+  earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
+  latest_offset: $info_max_time$
+rba:
+  message: The user $user$ ran the Query command to enumerate the remote system $dest$
+  risk_objects:
+  - field: user
+    type: user
+    score: 25
+  - field: dest
+    type: system
+    score: 25
+  threat_objects:
+  - field: process_name
+    type: process_name
+tags:
+  analytic_story: 
+  - Active Directory Discovery
+  asset_type: Endpoint
+  mitre_attack_id: 
+  - T1033
+  product: 
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  security_domain: endpoint
+tests:
+- name: True Positive Test
+  attack_data:
+  - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/query_remote_usage/query_remote_usage.log
+    source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
+    sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog