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Repository compromise: malicious files added (PolinRider / BeaverTail-style) via suspicious commit

High
raquelxmoss published GHSA-7592-xp4q-hq38 Jun 3, 2026

Package

Kit/actionmailer-text

Affected versions

SHA ce5b5f4b23691747a43057483760ff8f19f2e2a6

Patched versions

master, SHA 0d5292c7145f0cd624d2386546a81369f430cb64

Description

Impact

We identified malicious content committed to this repository as part of a broader GitHub compromise incident affecting multiple repositories.

The suspicious changes were introduced in this commit:

This commit added multiple files consistent with the “PolinRider / BeaverTail” attack pattern, including:

  • Malicious payload disguised as a font file

    • public/fonts/fa-solid-400.woff2
  • VS Code workspace configuration that can trigger code execution on open

    • .vscode/tasks.json (includes a task configured to run on folderOpen)
    • .vscode/settings.json, .vscode/launch.json, .vscode/extensions.json, etc.
  • Propagation/tooling indicators referenced in .gitignore

    • branch_structure.json
    • temp_auto_push.bat
    • temp_interactive_push.bat

Who is impacted: anyone who cloned, pulled, or checked out an affected revision while these malicious files were present. Risk is higher for anyone who opened the repository in VS Code/Cursor (or similar editors) and for any CI runner that built/tested an affected revision, as this malware family is typically associated with credential/token theft.

Timeframe (UTC)

Start: 2026-06-01 20:56:00
End: 2026-06-02 03:00:00

Patches

The malicious content has been removed from the repository as part of incident response. Users should ensure they are on a known-clean revision of the default branch and that none of the files listed above exist in their local working copy.

Workarounds

If you cloned/pulled the repository during the incident window, we recommend:

  1. Stop using the existing local clone. Delete the repository directory and re-clone from the cleaned default branch.
  2. Treat the machine as potentially compromised until verified, especially if you:
    • opened the repo in VS Code/Cursor, or
    • ran builds/tests/CI jobs against the affected revision.
  3. Rotate credentials that may have been present on the machine/runner (GitHub tokens, CI secrets, npm tokens, SSH keys, and any other environment credentials).
  4. Optionally, check for the specific artifacts listed above in any existing clones or backups.

References

Severity

High

CVE ID

No known CVE

Weaknesses

No CWEs