Impact
skilo add installs a skill by recursively copying the skill directory into the
target skills directory. The copy routine (copy_dir_all) classified each entry
with std::fs::DirEntry::file_type() — which does not follow symlinks — and
then copied non-directory entries with std::fs::copy(), which does
dereference symlinks.
As a result, a skill containing a symbolic link such as
reference.txt -> /home/<user>/.ssh/id_rsa was copied as a regular file whose
contents are the link's target. A malicious skill source — for example a git
repository installed via skilo add github.com/<attacker>/<skills>, or a local
path — could read arbitrary files readable by the user running skilo add (SSH
keys, cloud credentials, .env files, etc.) and place their contents inside the
installed skill directory, where the user or their agent may later read, share,
or sync them.
This is arbitrary local file disclosure (CWE-59 / CWE-61, symlink following)
triggered by installing an untrusted skills source.
Patches
Fixed in 0.11.1. copy_dir_all now rejects symbolic-link entries at any
recursion depth (failing closed with a dedicated error) instead of dereferencing
them.
Workarounds
- Only install skills from sources you trust.
- Inspect a skill source for symbolic links before running
skilo add.
Affected versions
Introduced together with the skilo add command in 0.5.0 and present through
0.11.0. Releases before 0.5.0 do not include the add command.
References
Impact
skilo addinstalls a skill by recursively copying the skill directory into thetarget skills directory. The copy routine (
copy_dir_all) classified each entrywith
std::fs::DirEntry::file_type()— which does not follow symlinks — andthen copied non-directory entries with
std::fs::copy(), which doesdereference symlinks.
As a result, a skill containing a symbolic link such as
reference.txt -> /home/<user>/.ssh/id_rsawas copied as a regular file whosecontents are the link's target. A malicious skill source — for example a git
repository installed via
skilo add github.com/<attacker>/<skills>, or a localpath — could read arbitrary files readable by the user running
skilo add(SSHkeys, cloud credentials,
.envfiles, etc.) and place their contents inside theinstalled skill directory, where the user or their agent may later read, share,
or sync them.
This is arbitrary local file disclosure (CWE-59 / CWE-61, symlink following)
triggered by installing an untrusted skills source.
Patches
Fixed in 0.11.1.
copy_dir_allnow rejects symbolic-link entries at anyrecursion depth (failing closed with a dedicated error) instead of dereferencing
them.
Workarounds
skilo add.Affected versions
Introduced together with the
skilo addcommand in 0.5.0 and present through0.11.0. Releases before 0.5.0 do not include the
addcommand.References