Summary

Two swallowed errors in ClientAuthentication.provision() cause mTLS client certificate authentication to silently fail open when a CA certificate file is missing, unreadable, or malformed. The server starts without error but accepts any client certificate signed by any system-trusted CA, completely bypassing the intended private CA trust boundary.

Details

In modules/caddytls/connpolicy.go, the provision() method has two return nil statements that should be return err:

Bug #1 — line 787:

ders, err := convertPEMFilesToDER(fpath)
if err != nil {
    return nil  // BUG: should be "return err"
}

Bug #2 — line 800:

err := caPool.Provision(ctx)
if err != nil {
    return nil  // BUG: should be "return err"
}

Compare with line 811 which correctly returns the error:

caRaw, err := ctx.LoadModule(clientauth, "CARaw")
if err != nil {
    return err  // CORRECT
}

When the error is swallowed on line 787, the chain is:

1. TrustedCACerts remains empty (no DER data appended from the file)
2. The len(clientauth.TrustedCACerts) > 0 guard on line 794 is false — skipped
3. clientauth.CARaw is nil — line 806 returns nil
4. clientauth.ca remains nil — no CA pool was created
5. provision() returns nil — caller thinks provisioning succeeded

Then in ConfigureTLSConfig():

6. Active() returns true because TrustedCACertPEMFiles is non-empty
7. Default mode is set to RequireAndVerifyClientCert (line 860)
8. But clientauth.ca is nil, so cfg.ClientCAs is never set (line 867 skipped)
9. Go's crypto/tls with RequireAndVerifyClientCert + nil ClientCAs verifies client certs against the system root pool instead of the intended CA

The fix is changing return nil to return err on lines 787 and 800.

PoC

1. Configure Caddy with mTLS pointing to a nonexistent CA file:

{
    "apps": {
        "http": {
            "servers": {
                "srv0": {
                    "listen": [":443"],
                    "tls_connection_policies": [{
                        "client_authentication": {
                            "trusted_ca_certs_pem_files": ["/nonexistent/ca.pem"]
                        }
                    }]
                }
            }
        }
    }
}

2. Start Caddy — it starts without any error or warning.

3. Connect with any client certificate (even self-signed):

openssl s_client -connect localhost:443 -cert client.pem -key client-key.pem

4. The TLS handshake succeeds despite the certificate not being signed by the intended CA.

A full Go test that proves the bug end-to-end (including a successful TLS handshake with a random self-signed client cert) is here: https://gist.github.com/moscowchill/9566c79c76c0b64c57f8bd0716f97c48

Test output:

=== RUN   TestSwallowedErrorMTLSFailOpen
    BUG CONFIRMED: provision() swallowed the error from a nonexistent CA file.
    tls.Config has RequireAndVerifyClientCert but ClientCAs is nil.
    CRITICAL: TLS handshake succeeded with a self-signed client cert!
    The server accepted a client certificate NOT signed by the intended CA.
--- PASS: TestSwallowedErrorMTLSFailOpen (0.03s)

Impact

Any deployment using trusted_ca_cert_file or trusted_ca_certs_pem_files for mTLS will silently degrade to accepting any system-trusted client certificate if the CA file becomes unavailable. This can happen due to a typo in the path, file rotation, corruption, or permission changes. The server gives no indication that mTLS is misconfigured.

References

• GHSA-hffm-g8v7-wrv7
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27586
• caddyserver/caddy@d42d39b
• https://gist.github.com/moscowchill/9566c79c76c0b64c57f8bd0716f97c48
• https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/releases/tag/v2.11.1
• https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-4539