ci: declare empty permissions on release workflow#798
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The release job clones the repo with DENOBOT_PAT, then runs
publish-release with the same PAT. The workflow GITHUB_TOKEN is unused.
permissions:{} captures that contract.
Style matches the per-job permissions block in ci.yml (contents:read +
id-token:write for trusted publishing).
Signed-off-by: Arpit Jain <arpitjain099@gmail.com>
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Pins the release job to
permissions: {}. The job checks out the repo withsecrets.DENOBOT_PAT, sets git author/committer todenobot, and runsdeno run -A jsr:@deno/rust-automation@0.22.1/tasks/publish-releasewithGITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.DENOBOT_PAT }}. The workflow's ownGITHUB_TOKENis never used.Defense-in-depth angle: a compromised third-party action (cf. CVE-2025-30066) runs inside the existing job context and exfiltrates whatever scope the workflow token holds via build logs. With
permissions: {}the token has zero scope to leak; release authority lives only inDENOBOT_PAT.Matches the per-job
contents: read+id-token: writeblock already declared inci.yml. YAML validated locally withyaml.safe_load.