-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 7
New issue
Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.
By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.
Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account
Use of Evidence generating key material for AE identification #399
base: main
Are you sure you want to change the base?
Conversation
draft-ietf-rats-corim.md
Outdated
|
||
The integrity of public and private key material and the secrecy of private key material must be ensured at all times. | ||
This includes key material carried in attestation key triples and key material used to verify the authority of triples (such as public keys that identify trusted supply chain actors). | ||
For more detailed information on protecting Trust Anchors, refer to {{Section 12.4 of -rats-arch}}. | ||
As it is possible to use the public part of an asymmetric key pair for Evidence generation to be used to identify an Attesting Environment, this method of potentially identifying unique instances of Attesting Environments (and profiling their respective owners) can come with privacy considerations that have to be carefully weighed. |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
The text here is not clear to me?
Are we saying:
- Asymmetric Key Pair used to sign the Evidence OR
- Public Part of Asymmetric Key pair is part of Evidence Claim used to identify the Attesting Env?
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
Public keys are PII unless they are for group signing (where the size of the group is privacy preserving).
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
Are we saying:
Asymmetric Key Pair used to sign the Evidence OR Public Part of Asymmetric Key pair is part of Evidence Claim used to identify the Attesting Env?
Yes. That happens and is a PII issue.
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
Public keys are PII unless they are for group signing (where the size of the group is privacy preserving).
Yes. Is the DAA scenario relevant here?
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
request please review the comment
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
Thanks! A couple of quick comments.
draft-ietf-rats-corim.md
Outdated
|
||
The integrity of public and private key material and the secrecy of private key material must be ensured at all times. | ||
This includes key material carried in attestation key triples and key material used to verify the authority of triples (such as public keys that identify trusted supply chain actors). | ||
For more detailed information on protecting Trust Anchors, refer to {{Section 12.4 of -rats-arch}}. | ||
As it is possible to use the public part of an asymmetric key pair for Evidence generation to be used to identify an Attesting Environment, this method of potentially identifying unique instances of Attesting Environments (and profiling their respective owners) can come with privacy considerations that have to be carefully weighed. |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
Public keys are PII unless they are for group signing (where the size of the group is privacy preserving).
Co-authored-by: Thomas Fossati <[email protected]>
yes Co-authored-by: Thomas Fossati <[email protected]>
okay Co-authored-by: Ned Smith <[email protected]>
fixes #156