Skip to content

Security: mathewmusango/emuplane

SECURITY.md

Security policy

Emuplane is a local lab — a control plane, console and gateway in front of an AWS emulator. It authenticates the people who use the console and issues the keys clients sign with. It is not hardened against the internet, and this page says so rather than implying otherwise.

The trust model, stated plainly

  • Console sessions are stored as digests, and so is the API bearer token; neither is recoverable from the store.
  • The gateway does not verify SigV4 signatures. It reads the access key from the credential scope, resolves the account, enforces region enablement and forwards the request unchanged — it is a router with an authorisation rule, not an authenticator.
  • Verification happens behind it, in the emulator: issued keys (AKIA…) are checked against the secret it minted. A 12-digit account id is that account's root and is accepted with any secret, which is what lets the control call the emulator as the account owner.
  • One account cannot see another's state. The deployment bearer token is the only cross-tenant caller, and it belongs to an operator, not to a login.
  • An email address belongs to exactly one principal, so a password reset resolves to one account rather than to the first row that happens to match. The reset answer is the same whether or not the address exists.

Deploy it on a lab network, or behind an authenticating proxy. Emuplane exposed directly to the internet is a configuration choice, not a supported deployment.

Reporting a vulnerability

Use Security → Report a vulnerability on this repository — it opens a private advisory only you and the maintainer can see — or email.

Please do not open a public issue, and do not post a working exploit in Discussions. Any other question about the model — how a rule is meant to behave, why something is refused — is welcome in Discussions.

A report is easiest to act on with the version or commit, what you did, what happened and what you expected.

In scope

  • Crossing the tenancy boundary: one account reading or changing another's state.
  • An authentication or session bypass in the console or the control API.
  • Path traversal in the console's static serving or in an object download.
  • Script injection in the server-rendered sign-in, reset or error pages.
  • A password-reset link that works twice, or outlives EP_RESET_SECONDS.
  • A reset or sign-up route that reveals whether an address, an account or a user exists.
  • A gateway rule that can be bypassed: a resource in a region the account has not enabled, or one name claimed by two accounts.

Where the emulator itself is wrong, rather than what Emuplane does with it, the report belongs to the emulator's project.

Supported versions

Only the latest release. Emuplane is pre-1.0, versions are cut from main, and CHANGELOG.md names what changed.

There aren't any published security advisories