Generate ownership proof for SessionKeys (#48)

This RFC changes the `SessionKeys` runtime api to support generating a
proof of ownership of the generated session keys.

text/0048-session-keys-runtime-api.md

@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+# RFC-0048: Generate ownership proof for `SessionKeys`
+
+|                 |                                                                                             |
+| --------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| **Start Date**  | 13 November 2023                                                                    |
+| **Description** | Change `SessionKeys` runtime api to support generating an ownership proof for the on chain registration. |
+| **Authors**     | Bastian Köcher                                                                    |
+
+## Summary
+
+This RFC proposes to changes the `SessionKeys::generate_session_keys` runtime api interface. This runtime api is used by validator operators to
+generate new session keys on a node. The public session keys are then registered manually on chain by the validator operator. 
+Before this RFC it was not possible by the on chain logic to ensure that the account setting the public session keys is also in 
+possession of the private session keys. To solve this the RFC proposes to pass the account id of the account doing the 
+registration on chain to `generate_session_keys`. Further this RFC proposes to change the return value of the `generate_session_keys` 
+function also to not only return the public session keys, but also the proof of ownership for the private session keys. The 
+validator operator will then need to send the public session keys and the proof together when registering new session keys on chain.
+
+## Motivation
+
+When submitting the new public session keys to the on chain logic there doesn't exist any verification of possession of the private session keys.
+This means that users can basically register any kind of public session keys on chain. While the on chain logic ensures that there are 
+no duplicate keys, someone could try to prevent others from registering new session keys by setting them first. While this wouldn't bring
+the "attacker" any kind of advantage, more like disadvantages (potential slashes on their account), it could prevent someone from 
+e.g. changing its session key in the event of a private session key leak.
+
+After this RFC this kind of attack would not be possible anymore, because the on chain logic can verify that the sending account 
+is in ownership of the private session keys.
+
+## Stakeholders
+
+- Polkadot runtime implementors
+- Polkadot node implementors
+- Validator operators
+
+## Explanation
+
+We are first going to explain the `proof` format being used:
+```rust
+type Proof = (Signature, Signature, ..);
+```
+
+The `proof` being a SCALE encoded tuple over all signatures of each private session 
+key signing the `account_id`. The actual type of each signature depends on the
+corresponding session key cryptographic algorithm. The order of the signatures in 
+the `proof` is the same as the order of the session keys in the `SessionKeys` type 
+declared in the runtime.
+
+The version of the `SessionKeys` needs to be bumped to `1` to reflect the changes to the 
+signature of `SessionKeys_generate_session_keys`:
+```rust
+pub struct OpaqueGeneratedSessionKeys {
+	pub keys: Vec<u8>,
+	pub proof: Vec<u8>,
+}
+
+fn SessionKeys_generate_session_keys(account_id: Vec<u8>, seed: Option<Vec<u8>>) -> OpaqueGeneratedSessionKeys;
+```
+
+The default calling convention for runtime apis is applied, meaning the parameters 
+passed as SCALE encoded array and the length of the encoded array. The return value 
+being the SCALE encoded return value as `u64` (`array_ptr | length << 32`). So, the 
+actual exported function signature looks like:
+```rust
+fn SessionKeys_generate_session_keys(array: *const u8, len: usize) -> u64;
+```
+
+The on chain logic for setting the `SessionKeys` needs to be changed as well. It
+already gets the `proof` passed as `Vec<u8>`. This `proof` needs to be decoded to
+the actual `Proof` type as explained above. The `proof` and the SCALE encoded
+`account_id` of the sender are used to verify the ownership of the `SessionKeys`.
+
+## Drawbacks
+
+Validator operators need to pass the their account id when rotating their session keys in a node. 
+This will require updating some high level docs and making users familiar with the slightly changed ergonomics.
+
+## Testing, Security, and Privacy
+
+Testing of the new changes only requires passing an appropriate `owner` for the current testing context. 
+The changes to the proof generation and verification got audited to ensure they are correct.
+
+## Performance, Ergonomics, and Compatibility
+
+### Performance
+
+The session key generation is an offchain process and thus, doesn't influence the performance of the 
+chain. Verifying the proof is done on chain as part of the transaction logic for setting the session keys. 
+The verification of the proof is a signature verification number of individual session keys times. As setting
+the session keys is happening quite rarely, it should not influence the overall system performance.
+
+### Ergonomics
+
+The interfaces have been optimized to make it as easy as possible to generate the ownership proof.
+
+### Compatibility
+
+Introduces a new version of the `SessionKeys` runtime api. Thus, nodes should be updated before 
+a runtime is enacted that contains these changes otherwise they will fail to generate session keys. 
+The RPC that exists around this runtime api needs to be updated to support passing the account id 
+and for returning the ownership proof alongside the public session keys.
+
+UIs would need to be updated to support the new RPC and the changed on chain logic.
+
+## Prior Art and References
+
+None.
+
+## Unresolved Questions
+
+None.
+
+## Future Directions and Related Material
+
+Substrate implementation of the [RFC](https://github.com/paritytech/polkadot-sdk/pull/1739).