Vulnerabilities

RUSTSEC-2025-0006

Hickory DNS failure to verify self-signed RRSIG for DNSKEYs

Details
Package	hickory-proto
Version	0.25.0-alpha.2
URL	GHSA-37wc-h8xc-5hc4
Date	2025-02-07
Patched versions	^0.24.3,>=0.25.0-alpha.5
Unaffected versions	<0.8.0

Summary

The DNSSEC validation routines treat entire RRsets of DNSKEY records as trusted once they have established trust in only one of the DNSKEYs. As a result, if a zone includes a DNSKEY with a public key that matches a configured trust anchor, all keys in that zone will be trusted to authenticate other records in the zone. There is a second variant of this vulnerability involving DS records, where an authenticated DS record covering one DNSKEY leads to trust in signatures made by an unrelated DNSKEY in the same zone.

Details

verify_dnskey_rrset() will return Ok(true) if any record's public key matches a trust anchor. This results in verify_rrset() returning a Secure proof. This ultimately results in successfully verifying a response containing DNSKEY records. verify_default_rrset() looks up DNSKEY records by calling handle.lookup(), which takes the above code path. There's a comment following this that says "DNSKEYs were already validated by the inner query in the above lookup", but this is not the case. To fully verify the whole RRset of DNSKEYs, it would be necessary to check self-signatures by the trusted key over the other keys. Later in verify_default_rrset(), verify_rrset_with_dnskey() is called multiple times with different keys and signatures, and if any call succeeds, then its Proof is returned.

Similarly, verify_dnskey_rrset() returns Ok(false) if any DNSKEY record is covered by a DS record. A comment says "If all the keys are valid, then we are secure", but this is only checking that one key is authenticated by a DS in the parent zone's delegation point. This time, after control flow returns to verify_rrset(), it will call verify_default_rrset(). The special handling for DNSKEYs in verify_default_rrset() will then call verify_rrset_with_dnskey() using each KSK DNSKEY record, and if one call succeeds, return its Proof. If there are multiple KSK DNSKEYs in the RRset, then this leads to another authentication break. We need to either pass the authenticated DNSKEYs from the DS covering check to the RRSIG validation, or we need to perform this RRSIG validation of the DNSKEY RRset inside verify_dnskey_rrset() and cut verify_default_rrset() out of DNSKEY RRset validation entirely.

RUSTSEC-2024-0421

idna accepts Punycode labels that do not produce any non-ASCII when decoded

Details
Package	idna
Version	0.5.0
URL	https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1887898
Date	2024-12-09
Patched versions	>=1.0.0

idna 0.5.0 and earlier accepts Punycode labels that do not produce any non-ASCII output, which means that either ASCII labels or the empty root label can be masked such that they appear unequal without IDNA processing or when processed with a different implementation and equal when processed with idna 0.5.0 or earlier.

Concretely, example.org and xn--example-.org become equal after processing by idna 0.5.0 or earlier. Also, example.org.xn-- and example.org. become equal after processing by idna 0.5.0 or earlier.

In applications using idna (but not in idna itself) this may be able to lead to privilege escalation when host name comparison is part of a privilege check and the behavior is combined with a client that resolves domains with such labels instead of treating them as errors that preclude DNS resolution / URL fetching and with the attacker managing to introduce a DNS entry (and TLS certificate) for an xn---masked name that turns into the name of the target when processed by idna 0.5.0 or earlier.

Remedy

Upgrade to idna 1.0.3 or later, if depending on idna directly, or to url 2.5.4 or later, if depending on idna via url. (This issue was fixed in idna 1.0.0, but versions earlier than 1.0.3 are not recommended for other reasons.)

When upgrading, please take a moment to read about alternative Unicode back ends for idna.

If you are using Rust earlier than 1.81 in combination with SQLx 0.8.2 or earlier, please also read an issue about combining them with url 2.5.4 and idna 1.0.3.

Additional information

This issue resulted from idna 0.5.0 and earlier implementing the UTS 46 specification literally on this point and the specification having this bug. The specification bug has been fixed in revision 33 of UTS 46.

Acknowledgements

Thanks to kageshiron for recognizing the security implications of this behavior.

Warnings

RUSTSEC-2024-0388

derivative is unmaintained; consider using an alternative

Details
Status	unmaintained
Package	derivative
Version	2.2.0
URL	mcarton/rust-derivative#117
Date	2024-06-26

The derivative crate is no longer maintained.
Consider using any alternative, for instance:

• derive_more
• derive-where
• educe

RUSTSEC-2024-0384

instant is unmaintained

Details
Status	unmaintained
Package	instant
Version	0.1.13
Date	2024-09-01

This crate is no longer maintained, and the author recommends using the maintained web-time crate instead.

RUSTSEC-2024-0370

proc-macro-error is unmaintained

Details
Status	unmaintained
Package	proc-macro-error
Version	1.0.4
URL	https://gitlab.com/CreepySkeleton/proc-macro-error/-/issues/20
Date	2024-09-01

proc-macro-error's maintainer seems to be unreachable, with no commits for 2 years, no releases pushed for 4 years, and no activity on the GitLab repo or response to email.

proc-macro-error also depends on syn 1.x, which may be bringing duplicate dependencies into dependant build trees.

Possible Alternative(s)

• manyhow
• proc-macro-error2
• proc-macro2-diagnostics

RUSTSEC-2021-0127

serde_cbor is unmaintained

Details
Status	unmaintained
Package	serde_cbor
Version	0.11.2
URL	https://github.com/pyfisch/cbor
Date	2021-08-15

The serde_cbor crate is unmaintained. The author has archived the github repository.

Alternatives proposed by the author:

• ciborium
• minicbor