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[Spec] Add browser bound keys privacy and security considerations. #296
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should be verified using the passkey (in addition to the BBK). The BBK provides | ||
an additional signature not a replacement for the passkey signature. | ||
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An attacker posing as a merchant may attempt to substitute a [=browser |
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I think it's more useful to first describe the attack in its entirety, then say why it doesn't work:
- Drop the lines "However, the bank will ..." and "Here again, ..."
- Add a line about what this means, e.g. that the attacker has defeated the 'device bound' part of BBKs
- Then say "However, this attack is not feasible as ..."
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Rephrased, please take another look.
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(Sorry, trying to reset my accidental approval, let's see if this works...)
Party=] in order to initiate SPC and the user must authenticate the transaction | ||
using their passkey. Since accessing the BBK public key requires access to the | ||
credential ID first, the BBK does not add any incremental tracking. | ||
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I think it could be useful to remind the reader here that the BBK is only available through SPC, and SPC necessarily involves a user interaction before the BBK is used.
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You raise a good point, Ian. I also noted that the BBK is available once on the initial passkey creation.
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Thanks for the feedback, Ian!
Party=] in order to initiate SPC and the user must authenticate the transaction | ||
using their passkey. Since accessing the BBK public key requires access to the | ||
credential ID first, the BBK does not add any incremental tracking. | ||
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You raise a good point, Ian. I also noted that the BBK is available once on the initial passkey creation.
This change adds privacy and security considerations related to browser bound keys. See also #286 for the implementation.
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